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INSULATING NEGLIGENT POLICE BEHAVIOR
IN INDIANA: WHY THE VICTIMS OF
A DRUNK DRIVER NEGLIGENTLY
RELEASED BY A POLICE
OFFICER HAVE NO REMEDY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indiana Supreme Court eliminated the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in 1972.1 Yet, more than fifteen years later, Indiana still immunizes
negligent police behavior.2 Recognizing that the victim could obtain no re-
lief in Indiana courts,3 consider the following hypothetical situation." Of-
ficer Jones' Friday night shift ends at 10:00 p.m.. At 9:50 p.m. Officer
Jones sees Mr. Smith run a red light and pulls him over. Officer Jones
detects a strong odor of alcohol when Mr. Smith rolls down his car window.
After speaking with Mr. Smith for a few moments, Officer Jones realizes
that Mr. Smith is intoxicated. It is now 9:55 p.m. and Officer Jones begins
his extra job as a warehouse security guard in only twenty minutes.
Officer Jones knows that the paperwork for a driving under the influ-
ence arrest will take him at least one hour to complete. Officer Jones also
1. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972). The doctrine of sovereign
immunity precludes action against a governmental unit unless the governmental unit consents
to suit. Abolition of sovereign immunity results in the ability of a plaintiff to sue the govern-
mental unit without its specific consent. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
2. Application of the public duty and special duty rules, and provisions of the Indiana
Tort Claims Act, work to insulate negligent police behavior from suit. See infra notes 60-117
and accompanying text.
3. This note focuses on tort actions brought in state court against police officers for
the failure to arrest intoxicated drivers. Discussion of possible action in federal court under
section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), is beyond the scope of this note. A
person may sue in federal court for damage caused by improper police conduct under section
1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
For a good summary of federal action against the police, see H. BERRINGER, CIVIL LIA-
BILITY AND THE POLIcE 20, 34 (1987).
4. The hypothetical proposed herein is not based on any specific case, nor is it in-
tended to resemble any case which may have in fact occurred.
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knows that no other police units are available to handle Mr. Smith's arrest.
Officer Jones suggests that Mr. Smith take a taxi home, but Mr. Smith
refuses this advice. Officer Jones then suggests that Mr. Smith go to a
nearby coffee shop to sober up. Officer Jones issues Mr. Smith a citation for
running the red light and heads back to the station.
Mr. Smith never goes to the coffee shop but instead continues driving.
Five minutes later Mr. Smith runs head-on into another car and seriously
injures Mr. and Mrs. Doe, occupants of the other vehicle. Hospital person-
nel treating the intoxicated Mr. Smith find the ticket written by Officer
Jones. Should Officer Jones and the municipality5 for which he works be
held liable?
Under Indiana law, it appears that Officer Jones would not be held
liable for the Does' injuries. No Indiana appellate level cases have dealt
with the specific issue of police and municipal liability for failure to arrest
or detain intoxicated drivers.6 The conclusion that Officer Jones would
probably not be held liable for the Does' injuries stems from Indiana's reli-
ance on the public duty rule,7 the special duty rule,8 and the Indiana Tort
Claims Act.9 Through the use of common law and statutory rules, Indiana
effectively insulates police from liability for failure to arrest or detain intox-
icated drivers.10
The public duty rule provides that a governmental unit will not be held
liable when the duty violated is one owed to the public generally and not to
5. The terms "governmental unit" and "municipality" will be used interchangeably
within this note.
6. But cf. Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The plaintiff
in Sports, Inc. brought suit after Riggs, a customer at a racetrack, hit the car in which the
Gilbert family rode. The defendant in the case, Sports, Inc., owned a racetrack and employed
off-duty police officers as security guards. Id. at 535. While in the racetrack parking lot, Riggs
had hit a parked car with his pickup truck. Id. The security guards investigated the parking lot
collision and found Riggs to be intoxicated, but released him and later saw him being driven
from the racetrack by a relative. Id. Two blocks from the racetrack, Riggs, now driving, ran a
red light and hit the plaintiff's car. Id. The Indiana Appellate Court held that Sports, Inc. had
no duty to detain Riggs when it discovered that he was intoxicated on its property. Id. at 539-
40. While the Sports, Inc. case may appear to decide the issue, the case is different from the
type of situation at issue here for a number of reasons. Most significantly, Sports, Inc. involved
off-duty police officers and a non-governmental private employer. For further discussion con-
cerning the Sports, Inc. case see generally Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 16
IND. L. REv. 379 (1983).
7. See infra notes 60-92 and accompanying text for further discussion regarding the
public duty rule.
8. See infra notes 93-139 and accompanying text for additional discussion regarding
the special duty rule.
9. See infra notes 140-58 and accompanying text for further discussion pertaining to
the Indiana Tort Claims Act.
10. See infra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
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a particular individual. 11 For example, if the public duty rule were applied
to the Officer Jones hypothetical, no liability would result. Because Officer
Jones owed only a general duty to the public to remove the intoxicated Mr.
Smith from the road, Officer Jones owed no specific duty to the Does as
individuals. Since Officer Jones owed no individual duty to the Does, no
duty existed for Officer Jones to breach. Therefore, Officer Jones and the
municipality for which he works could not be held liable. States which util-
ize the public duty rule 2 most frequently apply it in cases where the police
allegedly fail to provide adequate protection from crime.' s A limited num-
ber of courts have utilized the public duty rule within the context of cases
involving police failure to arrest or detain intoxicated drivers.' 4
11. See W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1049 n.81
(5th ed. 1984) ("[The] doctrine holds that some unspecified duties are owed only to the public
and private individuals have no redress for their violation."). See also Tinsley, Governmental
Entity's Liability for Failure to Prevent Crime, 30 P.O.F. 2d 429, 437 (1982) (The general
rule, which is followed in most states, is that a municipality or other governmental entity has
no duty to provide protection to particular individuals and that negligent failure to provide
such protection is therefore not a basis for tort liability.).
12. See infra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
13. The most celebrated case wherein a court found no liability for failure to provide
police protection is Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). In Riss, a young woman repeatedly called police over a
six month period asking for protection from her ex-boyfriend who threatened to maim her
unless she returned to him. Id. at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901. After the
woman became engaged to another man, the rejected suitor threatened her again. The woman
called the police to ask for protection, but she received no help. The next day a man hired by
the rejected suitor threw lye in the woman's face, permanently disfiguring her. Id. Despite a
strong dissent by Judge Keating, wherein he declared: "To say that there is no duty is, of
course, to start with the conclusion," id., the New York Court of Appeals held that the city
could not be held liable for failure to provide adequate police protection. Id. at 579, 240
N.E.2d at 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 879. See, e.g., Culy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255,
505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987) (landlord and sons injured in confrontation with
tenant could not recover against the city for alleged failure to provide adequate police protec-
tion); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St. 3d 222, 525, N.E.2d 468 (1988) (no
liability for village after police officer decided not to dispatch help outside the village's jurisdic-
tion even though the crime was committed within 300 yards of the village police station). See
generally Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Excusing Governmental 'Unit From Tort Liabil-
ity on Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty Was Owed Under Circumstances, 38
A.L.R. 4th 1194 (1985); Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Failure to Provide Adequate
Police Protection in New York State, 39 ALB. L. REV. 599 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Police
Protection] (analyzes New York law regarding municipal tort liability for the failure to pro-
vide adequate police protection against the criminal acts of third parties); Note, Police Liabil-
ity for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1981) [hereinafter Note,
Failure to Prevent Crime] (courts have generally shielded police officers and their employers
from liability for failure to provide reasonable protection from crime).
14. The State of Missouri recognizes the pure form.of the public duty rule. Missouri
courts faced with police failure to arrest or detain intoxicated drivers have not imposed liabil-
ity. Two 1987 Missouri decisions involving police officers failing to arrest or detain intoxicated
drivers applied the public duty rule, resulting in favorable judgments for the police. In Spotts
v. City of Kansas City, a highway patrolman stopped an allegedly intoxicated driver and is-
1989]
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Many courts attempt to avoid the harsh effects15 of the public duty
rule by applying an exception known as the special duty rule."6 The special
duty rule provides that if a special relationship17 develops between a munic-
ipality and a plaintiff-a relationship wherein the municipality assumes a
responsibility toward the plaintiff-liability will attach for breach of the
established duty.' For example, if the police receive information from a
sued him a citation for expired license plates. Spotts v. City of Kansas City, 728 S.W.2d 242,
244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). The plaintiff in the case was a passenger in another car stopped on a
road where traffic had stopped due to an accident obstructing the roadway. While the plaintiff
waited to proceed, the driver released by the highway patrolman ran into the rear of the car in
which the plaintiff sat, with the resulting accident rendering the plaintiff-passenger a paraple-
gic. Id. at 244-45.
In Schutte v. Sitton, Sitton, a police officer, was called to a pizzeria to investigate a
disturbance. Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Sitton spoke to
Hall, who allegedly caused the disturbance, and told him to leave. Id. Hall left the pizzeria
shortly thereafter and, while driving in an intoxicated condition, crossed the center line of the
highway and struck the Schutte vehicle. Id. The Missouri court applied the public duty rule to
insulate Officer Sitton from liability and stated that "any duty Sitton may have had to prevent
Hall from driving while intoxicated was a duty owed to the general public." Id. at 211.
15. Application of the public duty rule is considered a harsh blow to the plaintiff be-
cause the plaintiff is left remediless. See Comment, The Special Duty Doctrine: A Just Com-
promise, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 409, 421 (1987) (application of the special duty rule allows
courts to retain elements of the public duty rule yet mitigate its harshness); Note, Government
Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 VILL. L. REV. 505, 513 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Government Liability] (the public duty doctrine has come under increasing criticism in recent
years for its harsh effect upon victims). See, e.g., Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App.
3d, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975) (police not liable for failing to respond to woman's call for protec-
tion 45 minutes before she was killed even though police had responded to 20 calls from the
same woman in the past); Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782
(1975) (patrolmen owed a duty to the public generally in the enforcement of traffic ordinances
against drag racing; bystander who was hit while watching the drag races could not recover);
Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (1980) (an individual cannot obtain damages where an
officer owes a duty to the public as a whole and no special relationship is established); Schutte
v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("any duty [a police] officer may have
had to prevent Hall from driving was a duty owed to the general public"); Doe v. Hendricks,
92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979) (city could not be held liable for police failure to appre-
hend sexual assault suspect because the police duty was only owed to the general public).
16. Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 90 A.D.2d 134, 135, 457 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1982)
(the exception to the rdle occurs where a duty of care results from the establishment of a
special relationship between the municipality and the individual). See, e.g., Schuster v. City of
New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (police owe a special
duty to a citizen who collaborates with the police and is placed in danger because of the
collaboration); DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611
(1983) (special relationship existed between murder victim and police where victim phoned
police to report a burglar was breaking into her house and police responded to the wrong
address); Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (1978)
(subsequent to cooperation with police in an official investigation a special duty to protect that
individual may arise if retaliation appears possible).
17. The special duty rule is often referred to as the special relationship rule or the
special duty exception. For purposes of this note, the terms are interchangeable.
18. Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 90 A.D.2d 134, 135, 457 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1982)
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citizen leading to the arrest of a dangerous criminal, promise to protect that
citizen, and then fail to provide protection, liability will attach. 9 Essen-
tially, the governmental unit becomes obligated to a particular citizen
through the government's own conduct and not through the existence of a
,duty., 20
This note explores the validity of the continued use of the public duty
rule as it exists in Indiana2 within the context of police failure to arrest or
detain intoxicated drivers. This note concludes that the public duty and spe-
cial duty rules should be eliminated by Indiana courts because these rules
immunize negligent police behavior.22 Elimination of the public duty and
special duty rules by Indiana courts could stimulate legislative thought2 3
regarding the abolition of portions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act which
currently immunize negligent police behavior in favor of a traditional negli-
gence analysis.2 4
(a particularized assumption of responsibility creates a special duty on the part of the munici-
pality, liability may attach for a breach of that duty).
19. See, e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
20. Tvicevic v. City of Glendale, 26 Ariz. App. 460, 461, 549 P.2d 240, 241 (1976)
("[there are] situations where a government or governmental agency can by its own conduct
narrow an obligation to an individual for the breach of which [it] is answerable in damages.")
(citing Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 25, 509 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1973)). See also
Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 378 (1969). "Simply stated, there are
situations where a government, or agency thereof, can by its conduct, narrow an obligation
owing to the general public into a special duty to an individual, for the breach of which it is
responsive in damages." Id. at 523, 456 P.2d at 381; Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d
255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987). In Cuffy, the New York Court of Appeals
defined the elements of a special relationship as:
I. an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty
to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
2. knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm;
3. some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party;
4. that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.
Id. at 260, 505 N.E.2d at 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 375. Therefore, as defined in New York, the
actions or knowledge of the municipality determine the nature of the relationship between the
municipality and the injured party. Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at 604.
21. See infra notes 60-92 and accompanying text for further discussion regarding the
public duty rule.
22. As a general proposition, negligent police behavior, particularly grossly negligent
police behavior, serves no public purpose. See infra notes 60-139 and accompanying text for
additional information pertaining to the immunization of police behavior in Indiana.
23. By taking the step of abolishing the public duty and special duty rules, Indiana
courts would be engaging in what Professors Tarr and Porter have described as "agenda set-
ting policy making." STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xvi-
xvii (M. Porter, G. Tarr eds. 1982). For a more detailed discussion of "agenda setting policy
making," see infra note 256.
24. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text for additional comment regarding
the use of traditional negligence analysis in scrutinizing police action.
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Section two of this note examines the current status of Indiana law
concerning the public duty rule, the special duty rule, and the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. 5 Section three discusses why the public duty rule, as a vestige
of sovereign immunity, should be abolished in Indiana.28 This section then
explores the possible adoption of a judicial standard from which to examine
negligent police conduct and determine municipal liability. 7 Finally, this
note examines current trends in policing and proposes that a flexible "para-
professional" standard be applied to negligent police behavior in Indiana. 8
II. POLICE AND MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY IN INDIANA
In order to recover in a traditional tort negligence action, one must
show that a duty existed. 9 A duty is the obligation of one entity to conform
to a particular legally recognized standard of conduct when dealing with
another entity.30 An action arises in tort where one party breaches a duty to
a second party and the second party, suffers injuries caused by the breach
of duty.$1 A tort action cannot be brought, however, if the party to be sued
is immune under the law.32 This section explores the current status of Indi-
ana law which immunizes police officers and municipalities from suit, in-
cluding the public duty and special duty rules, and the Indiana Tort Claims
25. See infra notes 60-158 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 179-208 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 209-29 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 230-59 and accompanying text.
29. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 30, at 164.
30. Id. at 356. See also M. SHAPO, THE DUTY To AcT xii-xiii (1977). Shapo discusses
alternative theories of duty, analyzing the numerous doctrines relating to certain fact patterns
and situations. Shapo explores the duties of both private persons and governmental entities in
his work and notes that relationships giving rise to the establishment of a duty may stem from
contractual, commercial, employment, other relationships, or emergency situations. Id.
31. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 30, at 164. Keeton describes the elements of a cause
of action in negligence as follows:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the
duty ....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury ...
or "proximate cause" ....
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
Id.
32. W. KEErON, supra note 11, § 131, at 1032. Immunity can generally be defined as
"a total or partial lack of amenability to the processes of the legal system that redress civil
wrongdoing," whereas liability can be defined as legal responsibility. S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE &
A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:1, at 14 (1985). Immunity has been extended to
a number of groups. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators free
from liability for what they do or say in legislative proceedings); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (judges immune from liability for judicial acts); Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280,
164 N.E.2d 563 (1960) (charities (although most states have now abolished this immunity)).
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Act."3
A. Sovereign Immunity
In order to fully understand the ramifications of the public duty rule in
Indiana, the status of sovereign immunity of the state must be explored."'
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity exempts a governmental
unit from tort liability.3 5 The doctrine, based on the notion that "the King
could do no wrong,"36 gradually gained acceptance throughout the United
States including Indiana.37 Historically, only federal and state governmen-
tal action derived tort exemption from the doctrine.3 8 Eventually, munici-
33. The Indiana Tort Claims Act states in pertinent part:
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of his employment is not
liable if a loss results from:
(6) the performance of a discretionary function;
(7) the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules
and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false
imprisonment; ...
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). See infra notes 140-58 and ac-
companying text.
34. See infra notes 60-139 and accompanying text (discussing the public duty and spe-
cial duty rules).
35. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 131, at 1033.
36. Id. See also Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
While the theory that "the King can do no wrong" has been generally accepted as a rationale
for sovereign immunity, Borchard notes that "the doctrine rests upon a serious misconception
of the origin of the dictum." Id. at 17. Borchard also notes a second justification for state
immunity, the concept that the state cannot be sued in tort because the authority "that makes
the law cannot be subject to the law." Id. Parker, The King Does Not Wrong-Liability for
Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952). Parker discusses the maxims that "the King
can do no wrong" and "the sovereign cannot be sued without his consent." Id.
37. See Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 58, 284 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1972) (provides
general discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Indiana); Comment, Municipal
Liability: The Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection-The Special Duty Rule Should
Be Discarded, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 499, 500 [hereinafter The Special Duty Rule Should Be
Discarded] (explores the general historical background of sovereign immunity and its develop-
ment in the United States); Note, Seymour National Bank v. State Interprets the Indiana
Tort Claims Act: Can the Enforcers Do No Wrong?, 16 IND. L. REV. 705, 706 (1983) [herein-
after Note, Interpretation] (provides an historical overview of the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity in Indiana); Note, Sovereign Immunity in Indiana-Requiem?, 6 IND. L. REv. 92 (1972)
(traces the development of sovereign immunity and governmental tort responsibility in
Indiana).
38. The sovereign immunity
[d]octrine precludes [the] litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action
against a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless [the] sovereign consents to
suit. Historically, the federal and state governments, and derivatively cities and towns,
were immune from tort liability arising from activities which were governmental in na-
ture. Most jurisdictions, however, have abandoned this doctrine in favor of permitting
tort actions with certain limitations and restrictions.
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palities also received protection under the sovereign immunity doctrine.39
The erosion of sovereign immunity in Indiana began in the 19th cen-
tury."0 The so-called "governmental-proprietary" distinction developed dur-
ing this time.41 Proprietary activity is any defined as activity performed in
an official governmental capacity that is commercial or corporate in na-
ture.4 2 Conversely, governmental activity is that activity which is essential
to the functioning of the government in serving the public.4 s In making the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, Indiana courts
accepted the proposition that the government could be held liable when en-
gaged in proprietary activity, but not when the government engaged in gov-
ernmental duties. 44 However, the imposition and continued application of
this distinction led to confusion and uncertainty regarding the status of sov-
ereign immunity within the state.4
5
In 1967, an Indiana appellate court contributed to the demise of sover-
eign immunity by abolishing municipal immunity."' Yet another step to-
ward the abolition of sovereign immunity came in 1968, when counties lost
the protection of the sovereign immunity doctrine. 4 7 As a result of these
decisions, only the state retained the protection provided by the sovereign
immunity doctrine.4" In 1969, the Indiana Supreme Court limited even
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 724 (5th ed. 1983).
39. The first case extending the sovereign immunity doctrine to municipalities was Rus-
sell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
40. Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196, 21 N.E. 657 (1889). In Goshen, the City of Go-
shen failed to repair a bridge. The city was held liable for injuries the plaintiff's horse sus-
tained as a result of the bridge's collapse. Id. at 200, 21 N.E. at 659.
41. See Note, Sovereign Immunity in Indiana-Requiem?, 6 IND. L. REv. 92, 93-94
(1972) ("The first inroad into Indiana's position of absolute immunity for all governmental
subdivisions and the first step in the doctrine's evolutionary process manifested itself as a lim-
ited form of liability imputed to the state's municipalities for injury arising out of certain city
activities.").
42. Id. at 94 (discusses the governmental-proprietary distinction).
43. Id. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (5th ed. 1983).
44. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 58, 284 N.E.2d 733, 734 (1972); Note, supra note
41, at 96.
45. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 53, 58, 284 N.E.2d 733, 735 (1972) (failure to estab-
lish criteria by which to determine the difference between a proprietary and a governmental
function led to confusion). See Flowers v. Board of Comm'rs, 240 Ind. 668, 672, 168 N.E.2d
224, 226 (1960) (counties could be held liable under governmental-proprietary distinction).
For additional discussion regarding the governmental-proprietary distinction, see Comment,
The Special Duty Rule Should Be Discarded, supra note 37, at 504.
46. Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 667, 231 N.E.2d 169, 173
(1967) (municipality may be held liable for the torts of police officers); Campbell v. State, 259
Ind. 55, 60, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1972). See Note, supra note 41, at 96.
47. Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs, 143 Ind. App. 155, 177, 239 N.E.2d 160, 173
(1968) (counties could be held liable for the torts of its officers, agents, or employees); Camp-
bell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 60, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1972). See Note, supra note 41, at 96.
48. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 60, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1972) ("In the after-
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state sovereign immunity by recognizing that the governmental-proprietary
distinction could be applied to the state; thus, the state could be held liable
for torts committed while performing a proprietary function.4
Motivated by a desire to eliminate confusion surrounding sovereign im-
munity,50 the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the doctrine completely in
1972.51 The court dismissed the argument that abolition of sovereign immu-
nity would result in financial disaster for the state and noted that cities and
counties operating without the protection of the doctrine had not col-
lapsed.5 2 Furthermore, the court indicated that the state could better absorb
the cost of an injury than could an individual and that the legislature could
more efficiently deal with the problems that removal of the doctrine would
create.
53
Although the Indiana Supreme Court" rejected sovereign immunity;
the court left the public duty rule intact.55 Specifically, the court noted that
governmental units should not be held liable for all damages to persons
resulting from any governmental acts or omissions.5 The court further
noted that the government must owe a specific duty to a private individual
before damages for a breach of that duty could be awarded.5 7 Thus, while
the court rejected sovereign immunity, other forms of immunity remained,58
math of Klepinger, all that remained of immunity was immunity to the state.").
49. Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969) (court used governmental-
proprietary distinction in finding state amenable to suit). See Note, supra note 41, at 96.
50. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 60, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1972) ("With only a
mere fraction of the original doctrine remaining, we are faced with the task of attempting to
eliminate the confusion surrounding the doctrine.").
51. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972).
52. Id. at 737.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Note, supra note 41, at 102 ("the court clearly dictated the future existence of
some form of state immunity from tort liability").
56. The court stated:
[W]e do not mean to say by this opinion that all governmental units can be held liable
for any and all acts or omissions which might cause damage to persons. For example, one
may not claim a recovery because a city or state failed to provide adequate police protec-
tion to prevent crime....
Therefore it appears that in order for one to have standing to recover in a suit
against the state there must have been a breach of duty owed to a private individual.
Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 62, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (1972).
57. Id.
58. Id. While the Campbell court eliminated sovereign immunity, the decision failed to
clarify when governmental units would not be held liable for their actions. Id. One form of
immunity apparently left intact by the Campbell decision is the discretionary-ministerial dis-
tinction. Extensive discussion of the discretionary-ministerial distinction is beyond the scope of
this note. Many courts still use this distinction in their analysis of cases involving the failure of
police officers to arrest or detain intoxicated drivers. The test has been summarized as follows:
[U]nder the official immunity test, one must determine whether a particular act is discre-
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including the public duty rule.5 9
B. The Public Duty Rule
Despite the demise of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Indiana, the
public duty rule60 continues to flourish.61 Therefore, in order to recover on a
tionary, i.e., requiring the official to exercise his judgment as a part of a decision making
process, or ministerial, i.e., required to be performed without the exercise of judgment.
An official is immune from liability for torts arising out of a discretionary act but he is
subject to liability for negligently performing ministerial acts.
Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Oberkramer v. City of
Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)). See also Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392
Mass. 745, 753, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (1984) (decision of a police officer to remove an
intoxicated person from the highway is not a discretionary act); Comment, supra note 15, at
415 (a discretionary act requires logic and reasoning; a ministerial act requires certain pre-
scribed performances when a particular set of facts occur); Note, Allowing the Drunk to
Drive: Should the Government Pay?, 51 Mo. L. REV. 601, 607 (1986) (discretionary acts have
been described as those which involve a high degree of discretion and judgment in weighing
alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning); Comment, supra
note 37, at 506 (discretionary acts involve policy formulation while ministerial acts involve the
execution of policy); Annotation, Failure to Restrain Drunk Driver as Ground of Liability of
State or Local Government Unit or Officer, 48 A.L.R. 4th 320, 327 (1986).
59. See also Board of Comm'rs of Delaware County v. Briggs, 167 Ind. App. 96, 337
N.E.2d 852 (1975). "The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been in an unsettled state in
Indiana despite the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. State ..... " Id. at 96, 337
N.E.2d at 859. See generally Note, supra note 37, at 102-07; Note, Interpretation, supra note
37, at 710.
60. The public duty rule originated in the 19th century as a common law doctrine. The
Supreme Court recognized the rule in South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). In
South, the Court found that a sheriff could not be held liable for failure to keep the peace. The
complaint charged that the sheriff failed to preserve the public peace. The plaintiffs complaint
arose after he was kidnapped and forced to pay a ransom to be released, however, the plaintiff
failed to execute any writ in which he was personally interested. Id. at 401.
Many courts cite Thomas M. Cooley's 1880 treatise on tort law as the origin of the rule.
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CONTRACT (1880). Cooley states:
The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: that if the duty which the
official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or
an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury and
must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the
duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is
an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages.
Id. at 379. See also Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 262, 350 A.2d 782,
784 (1975); Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn. Supp. 167, 170, 110 A.2d 635, 638 (1954); Sawicki v.
Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St. 3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468 (1988); DeWald v. State, 719
P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986) (examples of courts citing to Cooley's treatise as the origin of the
rule).
Regardless of the conflict surrounding the origin of the rule, state courts soon followed the
lead of the Supreme Court in declining to attach liability to negligent acts performed within
the course of official governmental employment. Comment, supra note 15, at 418. See also
Munoz v. Cameron County, 725 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that generally
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claim, a plaintiff must show that the duty breached by the government offi-
cial was not owed simply to the general public, but was a duty owed to him
as an individual.6 2 Indiana courts have applied the public duty rule in a
number of situations.63 In fact, many of the cases noted by nationwide com-
mentators as examples of the rule's application are Indiana decisions."
For example, an Indiana appellate court found that the police should
not be held liable for failure to halt a crime wave that resulted in the loss of
a business since the police owed only a general duty to the public to stop
crime.65 Because the police did not owe a specific duty to the store owners
to stop crime, there could be no breach of duty or damage award.66 One
year later, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged its approval of this
courts have held "that the victim of the crime does not have recourse against the individual
policeman for failing to take action to prevent or stop the commission of a crime"). See gener-
ally Note, Tort Claims Act-The Death of the Public Duty-Special Duty Rule: Schear v.
Board of County Commissioners, 16 N.M.L. REv. 423, 426 (1986) (the public duty rule is
essentially a common law doctrine).
61. See infra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. Indiana courts do not utilize the pure form of the public duty rule. See, e.g., Ham-
mond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. App. 1983); Estate of Tanasijevich v. Hammond, 178
Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (1978) (police owed a special duty to protect property of
individual who provided information to them); Roberts v. State, 159 Ind. App. 456, 307
N.E.2d 501 (1974) (public official in charge of prisoner owes a special duty to the prisoner to
take reasonable precautions to preserve the prisoner's health and safety); Simpson's Food Fair,
Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971) (police not liable for
failure to halt crime wave that resulted in loss of business). See infra notes 93-139 and accom-
panying text for additional discussion regarding the use of the special duty exception to the
public duty rule by Indiana courts.
64. See, e.g., Annotation, supra note 13, at 1198; Comment, The Special Duty Rule
Should Be Discarded, supra note 37, at 508.
65. Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871
(1971). Simpson's involved a grocery store in Evansville, Indiana which was forced out of
business at a loss of SI,000,000. Id. at 388, 272 N.E.2d at 872. The plaintiff asserted police
failure to halt a crime wave as the source of its business problems. Id. at 389, 272 N.E.2d at
873.
66. In rejecting the plaintiff's assertions that a new theory of tort liability should be
adopted and a risk spreading analysis adhered to, the court looked at other state court deci-
sions. Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 388, 272 N.E.2d
871, 873 (1971). See, e.g., Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970) (city removal
of extra police from scene of rally prior to riot was not negligence; damaged store owners could
not recover); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), overruled in
Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (en banc); Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d
579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). See also Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis,
141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967). Brinkman involved the wrongful death of an
individual who called the police to take him to the hospital because he was seriously ill. In-
stead of taking the individual to the hospital, the police officer, thinking the man was drunk,
arrested him and took him to jail where he died. Id.
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appellate decision,"" and noted that governmental units cannot be held "ab-
solutely liable" for all acts or omissions which might cause damage or in-
jury to individuals.68
Proponents of the public duty rule have advanced a number of justifi-
cations for its continued use. The chief argument centers on the idea that
abolition of the rule would lead to extreme financial hardships on munici-
palities. 9 Many proponents fear that increasingly high damage awards may
bankrupt the budgets of municipalities and that possibly "staggering" lia-
bility could result."0 Additionally, the potential inability of municipalities to
pay increased insurance premiums is seen as potential fallout from the
rule's elimination. 
7
67. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 62, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (1972).
68. The public duty rule became further entrenched in Indiana law with the Simpson's
decision, which shielded governmental units from liability in cases where no duty to a private
individual was breached. Board of Comm'rs of Delaware County v. Briggs, 167 Ind. App. 96,
337 N.E.2d 852 (1975). The court in Briggs noted the problems inherent in the Campbell
decision because, even though the case abolished sovereign immunity, some forms of immunity
were left intact. The Briggs court attempted to explain the difference between a public and
private duty as discussed in Campbell. Id. at 104, 337 N.E.2d at 862. After a brief discussion
regarding the confusion arising from the Campbell court's statement regarding public duty,
the Briggs court concluded "that the state is immune from liability only if the agent is exercis-
ing his governmental discretion in the performance of a purely public duty." Id. Once again
one should note that the problem is in determining what is a public duty.
69. See Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 267, 737 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1987)
("[tihe standard rationale offered to support continued reference to the public duty doctrine
[is] the risk of excessive governmental liability"); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio
St. 3d 222, 231, 525 N.E.2d 468, 477 (1988) (one of the basic rationales behind the justifica-
tion of the public duty rule has been that of finance); Note, Governmental Tort Liability: A
New Limitation on the Public Duty Rule in Massachusetts? Irwin v. Town of Ware, 29 SuF-
FOLK U.L. REv. 667, 677 (1985) (proponents of the public duty rule, like proponents of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, defend the rule on the basis that abolition of the rule would
lead to extreme hardship for governmental units). But cf. Cracraft v. City of Saint Louis Park,
279 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (While apprehension of increased
liability of political subdivisions is understandable, the same arguments were raised in opposi-
tion to the removal of sovereign immunity. "These contentions proved to be false then and they
are just as likely to be false now.").
70. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 381 (1969) (the
doctrine advocated by the appellant could lead to "staggering" liability); Note, Negligence of
Municipal Employees: Re-Defining the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 720, 728
(1983) (the negative impact on public budgets is immeasurable and could conceivably bank-
rupt municipal budgets).
71. Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 50.
Insurance companies frequently cite Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292
(1984), as an example of expanded municipal insurance risks. Many members of the insurance
industry have claimed "[t]his is open liability," and that the "expansion of liability and dam-
ages has made it almost impossible to predict losses with sufficient accuracy." Id. The threat of
an increase in the number of lawsuits against municipalities has caused many insurance com-
panies to stop insuring them. Both large and small governmental units are experiencing insur-
ance problems. For example, the City of Dallas self-insured itself rather than pay a 900%
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Advocates of the public duty rule also assert that abrogation of the
rule would both impose an impossible burden on a municipality72 and con-
gest the court system.73 The argument that abandoning the rule would
place an overwhelming burden on a municipality74 stems primarily from the
notion that the limited availability of community resources restricts the
amount of protection that can be provided75 and that, therefore, govern-
ment cannot guarantee the safety of every citizen. Moreover, some advo-
cates assert that the legislative branch should deal with this issue,78 while
others argue that courts lack the expertise necessary to evaluate police con-
duct.77 Finally, proponents of the rule allege that dismissal of the public
duty rule would hamper law enforcement efforts because the police would
not be able to enforce the law free from worry about potential liability.78
increase in liability premiums. Id. at 48. See Note, Government Liability, supra note 15, at
534-35. The author of the note criticizes the argument that burdensome liability will result
from the abrogation of the public duty rule. Id. at 534. The author suggests that government
might protect its resources by imposing statutory limits on damages. Id. at 535-36. But cf.
Reske, Was There a Liability Crisis?, 75 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 46 (examines the municipal
"liability crisis" of the mid-1980s and the resulting lawsuits filed by 19 states).
72. Drushella v. City of Elgin, No. 86 C 2307, memorandum op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
26, 1987) (the rule that police should not be held liable for failure to prevent crime is a
reflection of the idea that such liability would put an impossible burden on the police) (citing
Santy v. Bresee, 129 II1. App. 3d 658, 662, 473 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1984)).
73. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 622, 510 A.2d 1078, 1084 (1986)
(the judicial system would be unnecessarily burdened by a policy wherein the police had to
ensure the safety of every citizen). See also Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at 602
(one policy concern in abolishing the rule is that the already overburdened courts will be del-
uged with inadequate police protection suits).
74. Drushella v. City of Elgin, No. 86 C 2307, memorandum op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
26, 1987) (if the police had to guarantee the safety of every citizen the burden would be
impossible) (citing Santy v. Bresee, 129 Il1. App. 3d 658, 662, 473 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1984)).
75. Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968) (the amount of protection is limited by the available resources of the community and
the legislative determination of how these resources are to be employed).
76. Note, supra note 70, at 725. See also Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at
603 (judicial reluctance to abolish the rule stems from a feeling that the legislature and not
the courts should change it).
77. Note, supra note 70, at 725, 727. See also Note, Police Protection, supra note 13,
at 602-03 (another policy concern exists in opposing the opening of police administrative deci-
sions to judicial interference); Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App.
387, 390, 272 N.E.2d 871, 875 (1971) (adoption of a new theory of tort liability against
municipalities would usurp legislative prerogative and interfere with separation of powers). See
generally D. HoRowITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (discussing the role of the
judiciary in fashioning social policy, including the advantages and disadvantages of the judicial
process).
78. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 629, 510 A.2d 1078, 1084 (1986)
("[Public] officials who act and react in the milieu of criminal activity where every decision to
deploy law enforcement personnel is fraught with uncertainty must have broad discretion to
proceed without fear of civil liability in the 'unflinching discharge of their duties' ") (quoting
Gregoirie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). See also Shore v. Town of Stonington,
1989]
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Opponents of continued application of the public duty rule advance a
number of persuasive counter arguments. Those opposing the rule assert
that the same fear of increased governmental liability existed before many
states moved to eliminate sovereign immunity.79 Because the feared in-
crease in liability awards did not materialize with the demise of sovereign
immunity, opponents assert that elimination of the public duty rule would
not lead to increased liability. 0 Additionally, opponents argue that both the
courts"' and legislatures" could limit the extent of municipal exposure to
liability, thus eliminating potential financial disaster.
Equally compelling are the arguments that the public duty rule is ineq-
uitable,83 illogical,84 and that it perpetuates immunity liability in disguise.85
187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982). "The adoption of a rule of liability where some kind of
harm may happen to someone would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits
desirable in our society. Should the officer try to avoid liability by removing from the road all
persons who pose any potential hazard, he may find himself liable in many instances for false
arrest." Id. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384. Law enforcement officers are faced with a constant
dilemma. On the one hand they are sued for arresting without a warrant, and on the other
they are pursued for failing to make such an arrest. Fusilier v. Russell, 345 So. 2d 543, 546
(La. Ct. App. 1977). In Irwin, the Town of Ware argued that the public interest would not be
served if police were to avoid interfering in doubtful cases because of fear of liability. Irwin v.
Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984).
79. See generally supra notes 34-59 for additional information concerning sovereign
immunity.
80. Note, supra note 69, at 679 n.69. See also Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d
579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting) ("The
fear of financial disaster is a myth. The same argument was made a generation ago in opposi-
tion to proposals that the state waive its defense of 'sovereign immunity'. The prophecy proved
false then and it would now."); Note, A Municipality Has a Duty to Protect an Individual if
Assurances of Protection Exist and There is Privity Between the Municipal Agents and the
Individual, 19 GONz. L. REV. 727, 736 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Protect] (essentially
the same rationales used by advocates of the public duty rule were previously set forth in
support of sovereign immunity); Note, Tort Law-Municipal Liability for Police Handling of
Intoxicated Drivers, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1071 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Intoxi-
cated Drivers] (traditional tort principles will limit liability).
81. Note, Intoxicated Drivers, supra note 80, at 1071 (limits are imposed by using
traditional tort principles). See also Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 240
N.E.2d 860, 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting) (courts would be
able to apply general tort principles to a case; strict liability would not automatically be
imposed).
82. Cf. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). The legisla-
ture could place a cap on liability. The statute discussed in Irwin, limited public employer
liability for the negligent acts or omissions of its employer to $100,000. Id. at 766, 467 N.E.2d
at 1306.
83. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986) (the rule creates needless confusion
and inequitable results); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 267, 737 P.2d 1257,
1260 (1987) (injured plaintiff's suffer harshly under the doctrine). See, e.g., Simonds v. Tib-
bitts, 165 Mich. App. 480, 419 N.W.2d 5 (1987) (plaintiff's action claiming that police officer
had a duty to motorist whose vehicle ran into her husband's was dismissed because police
officer only owed a duty to the public at large and not to any individual). See also supra notes
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Absent application of the public duty rule, the plaintiff in a tort action
against a governmental entity would be able to recover. However, if the
public duty rule is applied to the case, the plaintiff will never be able to
establish that a duty existed toward him because of the public status of the
tortfeasor8 8 Given such a scenario, opponents of the public duty rule be-
lieve that the harsh results of rule application are clear and that, as such,
the rule is merely another form of sovereign immunity.8 7
Continued criticism of the public duty rule has prompted many states
to modify88 or discard the rule. 9 Yet the rule still remains intact in its
15-16 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the harsh effects of the application of
the public duty rule.
84. Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at 601 (noting that the rule has been criti-
cized as being "illogical and an archaic vestige of sovereign immunity").
85. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976) ("we consider that the 'duty to
all, duty to no-one' doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity"); Leake v. Cain, 720
P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986) ("whether or not the public duty rule is a function of sovereign
immunity the effect of the rule is identical to that of sovereign immunity"); Bailey v. Town of
Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 267, 737 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1987) (citing Chambers-Castanes v.
King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 291, 669 P.2d 451, 468 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring)) ("the
doctrine has been attacked as perpetuating sovereign immunity in the guise of the public duty
doctrine."); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986) ("[t]he public-duty/special-duty
rule was in essence a form of sovereign immunity. . ."). See also Schear v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 673, 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1984). The public duty/special duty rule
bears a direct relationship to sovereign immunity. "The distinction between 'public duty' and
'special duty' is no less arbitrary and no less a vestige of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
than are the 'governmental-proprietary' and 'discretionary-ministerial' distinctions." Id. at
674, 687 P.2d at 732. Note, Government Liability, supra note 15, at 513 ("strict application of
the public duty doctrine resurrected complete sovereign immunity as to public officers"). But
see Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979). The distinction between
a public and special duty is not a fiction, is not artificial, and is not a relic of sovereign immu-
nity. The Minnesota court went on to refuse to abolish the distinction between the public duty
and the special duty rule. Id. at 806; Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275,
669 P.2d 451 (1983) (the criticism that the public duty doctrine reinstates the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is unfounded).
86. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986) (The major criticism of the public
duty rule is its harsh effect on plaintiffs who would be entitled to recover for their injuries but
for the public status of the tortfeasor.).
87. See generally Comment, The Special Duty Rule Should Be Discarded, supra note
37, at 508-09 (while the comment discusses the special duty rule as a form of sovereign immu-
nity instead of the public duty rule in general, the arguments advanced are applicable here);
Note, Duty to Protect, supra note 80, at 733 (Justice Utter, in Chambers-Castanes v. King
County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983), viewed the public duty rule as a "limited
form of sovereign immunity"); Note, Public Officer's Failure To Enforce Drunk-Driving Stat-
ute Does Not Create Actionable Duty to Injured Motorist, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 282 (1986)
(the court in Barratt revitalized the archaic doctrine of sovereign immunity by applying the
public duty rule).
88. See, e.g., Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078,
1085 (1986) (a plaintiff is not without recourse if he can establish that a special relationship
with the police existed); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 268, 737 P.2d 1257, 1260
1989]
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original form in at least one state. 0 However, the vast majority of states
which still employ the rule, including Indiana, 91 do so in a less severe form
by utilizing the special duty rule.9"
C. The Special Duty Rule
Indiana does not adhere to pure form of the public duty rule.93 Instead,
Indiana combines the use of the public duty rule with what is essentially an
exception to the rule known as the special duty rule."' A municipality will
be held liable under the special duty rule when a duty established through a
(1987) (recognizing four situations when a governmental unit owes a duty to a particular
individual rather than to the public at large).
89. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308,
656 P.2d 597 (1982) (discarded the public duty rule and stated that the exercise of determin-
ing whether a tortfeasor has a general or special duty to an injured party is a speculative one
which the court would no longer engage in); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (the
duty of a public entity is to be determined in the same manner as if it were a private party);
Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101
N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984) (trend is toward liability, there is no longer a need to distin-
guish between a public and a special duty); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 409, 591
P.2d 719, 725 (1979) (any distinction between "public" and "private" duty is precluded by
statute); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) ("[a]ny duty
owed to the public generally is a duty owed to individual members of the public"); DeWald v.
State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986). See also Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275,
290, 669 P.2d 451, 460 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) (there has been a trend in recent years
toward rejection of the rule).
90. Missouri still adheres to the public duty rule. See Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d
208, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Spotts v. City of Kansas City, 728 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). See supra note 14 for a discussion of the Schutte and Spotts decisions. See also
Berger v. City of University City, 676 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (the court dis-
cussed the special duty rule and broke it down into four elements in dicta, but did not apply
the rule). But see Tinsley, supra note 11, at 443 (all jurisdictions "apparently" recognize the
special duty exception to the public duty rule).
91. Annotation, supra note 13, at 1197-98. Indiana cases explicitly support the view
that governmental tort liability may be premised on a particular duty owed to an individual
rather than a general duty owed to the public. See infra notes 93-139 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Indiana's application of the public duty rule and special duty exception.
92. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 649
P.2d 894 (1982); Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (1975);
Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (1981); Huey v. Cicero, 41 111. 2d 361, 243
N.E.2d 214 (1968); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979); Brut-
tomesso v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 95 Nev. 151, 591 P.2d 254 (1979); DeLong v.
County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983); Cuffy v. City of
New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987). See also Annotation,
supra note 13, at 1197 (states supporting this view).
93. See supra notes 11-14, 60-92 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
pure form of the public duty rule.
94. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text for further discussion of the special
duty rule.
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special relationship between the municipality and an individual is subse-
quently breached.95
While the special duty rule permits recovery in specific circumstances,
application of the rule varies widely among states.98 Courts apply different
criteria in determining the establishment of a special relationship.9 7 The
two most frequently recognized indicators that a special relationship exists
are when citizen cooperation with the police puts the citizen in a position of
danger" or when the police promise to protect a citizen and subsequently
95. See Comment, supra note 15, at 420 (the special duty doctrine imposes liability
based on a special relationship between the individual and the defendant).
96. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 111. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d
147 (1966). In Gardner, police officers took the plaintiff to identify four persons who had
previously beaten up the plaintiff. The Gardner court found that the officers owed a special
duty to protect the plaintiff from harm. Id. at 380, 219 N.E.2d at 150. The court also held
that the officers breached their duty to protect the plaintiff when they allowed the suspects to
attack the plaintiff again after he identified them. Id. Simonds v. Tibbitts, 165 Mich. App.
480, 419 N.W.2d 5 (1987). The appellate court in Simonds held that no special duty existed
between a police officer who released an intoxicated motorist and a third party who was killed
by that motorist. Id. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). In
Irwin, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that a special relationship exists
between the police and the public in situations involving the failure of the police to arrest or
detain intoxicated motorists. Id. See also supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (contain-
ing various cases where the rule has been applied).
97. See Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 821. Courts have modestly
expanded the special relationship exception. These expansions can be categorized into five fact
patterns:
1. When the plaintiff is harmed as a consequence of his abetting the police, often as an
informer or witness;
2. When police extend express promises of protection to specific individuals;
3. When the police are aware of a danger to a specific individual, but have neither jeop-
ardized the plaintiff through their affirmative acts nor promised him protection;
4. When the police are aware of a narrowly defined and readily identifiable source of
danger to the public, but cannot reasonably foresee a specific victim;
5. When the police fail to provide protection from a general threat.
Id. at 825-27.
98. In 1959, the New York Court of Appeals decided the most frequently cited case
determining that a special relationship existed when a citizen assisted the police. Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The Schuster
case established the principle that the police owe a special duty to a citizen who collaborates
with the police and is placed in danger because of the collaboration. Id. at 80, 154 N.E.2d at
537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Thus, the plaintiff in Schuster, whose son had provided the police
with information leading to the arrest of a murder suspect, could recover damages. Id. For
additional analysis of the case, see Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 824;
Comment, Liability For Negligent Failure of Police to Protect Informer, 72 HARV. L. REv.
1386, 1387 (1959) (Schuster "is the first case to hold that there is a cause of action based
solely on a negligent failure of police protection"); Note, A Governmental Duty to Protect the
Citizen-The Schuster Case, 33 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 289, 297 (1959) (the majority in Schuster
seems correct as a matter of theory).
In 1978, an Indiana appellate court faced the issue of the failure of the police to provide
adequate protection to a citizen who had cooperated with the police. Estate of Tanasijevich v.
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fail to do so. 9
In addition, courts have recognized other situations from which a spe-
cial relationship may arise.?° While a special relationship may exist in a
particular situation, a court's willingness to find that a relationship exists
and then to attach liability depends largely on the facts of the case and
current public policy concerns. 101 Thus, special relationships have been
found in three additional areas: °10 first, when the police are aware of danger
City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (1978). The Tanasijevich court found
that a special relationship existed when a citizen cooperated with the police, and the citizen's
property was later damaged by vandals in retaliation. Id. at 670, 383 N.E.2d at 1083.
99. For example in at least one case a court has found that a sheriff who promised to
warn of the release of a prisoner from jail and failed to do so could be held liable, when the
prisoner killed the decedent. Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr.
508 (1964). In Silverman v. City of Fort Wayne, the court held that the trial court's dismissal
for failure to state a claim was improper where the complainant had alleged that city officials
promised to protect Silverman's property, protected it for some time, and then stopped provid-
ing protection. Silverman v. City of Fort Wayne, 171 Ind. App. 415, 357 N.E.2d 285 (1976).
When the protection stopped, Silverman's property was damaged. The allegation of an existing
promise necessitated a determination of whether the promise to protect Silverman's property
rose to the level of a special relationship. The case was remanded to determine whether a
special duty was established. Id. Another example is the case of DeLong v. County of Erie, 60
N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983). In DeLong, the court found the
county liable after a woman called 911 to report a burglary and was assured help was on the
way. Officers responded to the wrong address, and instead of attempting to determine what the
problem with the address was, the dispatcher filed the call as a fake. The burglar killed the
caller. Id. at 300-01, 457 N.E.2d at 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 614. Additionally, a Washington
court has noted that the police have a duty to provide services when "(1) there is some form of
privity between the police department and the victim that sets the victim apart from the gen-
eral public, and (2) there are explicit assurances of protection that give rise to reliance on the
part of the victim." Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 286, 669 P.2d
451, 458 (1983).
The case of Warren v. District of Columbia stands in contrast to the aforementioned
cases. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (en banc). In Warren, two
men broke into a home occupied by three women. Id. at 2. While the men raped the woman
living on the second floor, her roommates living on the third floor called the police. Id. The
police assured the women help would be forthcoming. Id. The two women who phoned the
police eventually were raped by the men because the police dispatched pursuant to the first call
never entered the house, and no police were dispatched after the second call the women made.
Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court decision and dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 3. The court quoted from the trial court decision, stating that
"a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services such as
police protection to any particular individual citizen." Id. Another example of a case wherein a
court found the police owed no special duty to the plaintiff is Henderson v. City of St. Peters-
burg, 247 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1971). The Henderson court found no special duty existed where the
plaintiff, who had received police assurances they would protect him as he made business deliv-
eries in a dark and secluded part of town, was shot by unknown assailants.
100. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
102. See Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 825-27. See also I. SILVER,
POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 907 [1]-[5] (Matthew Bender ed. 1986). Silver notes the following
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to a specific individual but neither promise action nor jeopardize the plain-
tiff through affirmative acts;103 second, when the police fail to provide pro-
tection from a general crime pattern well known to the police;"" and fi-
types of situations in which a special relationship is usually recognized:
1. Duty to protect informers;
2. Negligent failure to protect individual under court protective order;
3. Special relationships created by statutory duties: child abuse;
4. Promise to protect/duty to warn;
5. Special duty to protect those apparently inebriated.
Id.
103. See Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966) (plain-
tiff who had been issued a protective order by the court against her estranged husband failed
to receive police protection after presenting the order to a police officer; plaintiff's estranged
husband later shot her); Jones v. County of Herkimer, 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.2d 925
(1966) (failure by villages to control rejected suitor, and failure to protect victim of shooting
by rejected suitor, created a special relationship between the police and victim); Tinsley, supra
note 11, at 446-59; Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 824-27. But see Hartzler
v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975) (police not liable for failing to
respond to woman's call for protection 45 minutes before she was killed even though police had
responded to 20 calls from the same woman in the past); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32
Cal. 3d 197, 647 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982) (no special relationship existed between
police and plaintiff where plaintiff was stabbed in laundromat while officers had the laundro-
mat under surveillance and saw the probable suspect outside before the stabbing but failed to
warn the plaintiff of the suspect's presence); Bruttomesso v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 95
Nev. 144, 591 P.2d 254 (1979) (no special relationship existed when the plaintiff was stabbed
in a parking lot where the police department had been asked to provide extra security but did
not due to a lack of manpower); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (plaintiff's repeated calls to police asking for protection from ex-
boyfriend did not give rise to special relationship status); Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590
P.2d 647 (1979) (no duty existed between sexually assaulted 12 year old boy and police chief,
who was the only officer available at the time a call was made by a witness to the police
notifying the dispatcher that the boy had been dragged in a house by an unidentified man);
Munoz v. Cameron County, 725 S.W.2d 319 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986) (no liability for sheriff who
failed to execute arrest warrant before husband shot plaintiff's mother).
104. An example of a case wherein police failed to protect an individual from a known
crime problem is Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1969). The
Bass court found the housing authority liable for assuming the duty to provide police protec-
tion in a housing project with a high crime rate and history of disorderly activity. Id. at 468-
69, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 805. The court rejected the argument that providing a police presence in
such a high crime area would be an unrealistic economic burden. Id. The case involved the
rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl within the project when the only police officer assigned
to the project was on a lunch break. Id. In 1972, the trial court decision in Bass was reversed.
Bass v. City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972), affid, 32 N.Y.2d 894,
346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973). The appellate court in the Bass case stated that no special duty of
protection existed. Id. at 415, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 577. An Indiana decision similar to the trial
court's decision in Bass decision is Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind.
App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971). In Simpson's, the plaintiff alleged that the failure of police
to halt a crime wave in the area of plaintiff's grocery store forced the plaintiff to go out of
business. The Indiana Appellate Court found that "[g]overnmental units cannot be 'absolutely
liable' for any and all acts or omissions which might cause damage to private citizens." Id. at
394, 272 N.E.2d at 875. See Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 824-27. For
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nally, when the specific victim of an identified source of danger is
foreseeable. 0 5 The failure to arrest intoxicated drivers falls into the last
category.0' Therefore, a court analyzing a case involving the failure of a
police officer to arrest an intoxicated driver could apply the special duty
rule and reason that the injuries suffered by the victim of a drunk driver
were foreseeable consequences of the release of that driver by the police. 07
additional discussion see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
105. See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984):
A duty to act with reasonable care to prevent harm to a plaintiff which, if violated, may
give rise to tort liability is based on a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the
defendant.... While several different categories of such special relationships are recog-
nized at common law, they are based to a large extent on a uniform set of considerations.
Foremost among these is whether a defendant reasonably could foresee that he would be
expected to take affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to
the plaintiff for failure to do so.... As the harm which safely may be considered foresee-
able to the defendant changes with the evolving expectations of a maturing society, so
change the "special relationships" upon which the common law will base tort liability for
failure to take affirmative action with reasonable care.
We have discerned such a special relationship in cases addressing the liability of
private parties to members of the general public where alcohol and driving were involved.
Id. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1301. Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 824-27. See
also Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987) (police officer who
releases an intoxicated driver is releasing a dangerous instrument onto the highway). But see
Bailey v. Town of Forks, 38 Wash. App. 656, 664, 688 P.2d 526, 531 (1984), rev'd, 108 Wash.
2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987) ("A police officer's mere contact with an intoxicated person
hardly creates the same type of relationship as exists between a psychiatrist and his patient, or
a custodian and his inmate."); Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal. App. 3d 983, 986, 194 Cal. Rptr.
553, 556 (1983) (no special relationship was created by officers investigating a party involving
alcohol and minors, after which intoxicated minors from the party were involved in an auto
accident); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 622, 510 A.2d 1078, 1085 (1986)
(police officer's contact with an intoxicated driver before the driver struck a pedestrian did not
rise to a level of special relationship).
106. See Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 827.
107. See Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), overruled in
Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (en banc). Examination of the special duty
rule application within the context of police failure to arrest or detain intoxicated drivers illus-
trates the varied ways in which states apply the special duty rule. Thus, in some states the rule
will be applied in this situation, and in other states it will not. This footnote examines several
of these cases, thus demonstrating this proposition.
The Massengill case involved a head-on collision in which five people died and six others
were permanently disabled. Id. at 519, 456 P.2d at 378. In Massengill, two individuals had
left a parking lot driving their vehicles in a reckless manner down a dangerous stretch of
highway. Id. The vehicles passed a sheriff's deputy parked alongside the road. Id. The deputy
followed the vehicles, but failed to stop or detain the drivers before the ensuing accident oc-
curred. Id. The plaintiffs in the case argued that the sheriff had both a duty and an opportu-
nity to arrest the vehicle operators, but that he failed to carry out this duty. The defendant
argued that no duty existed and that even if there was a duty, the breach of that duty was not
the proximate cause of the accident. Id. The court held that the duty owed to the plaintiffs by
the defendant was one owed only to the public generally and not owed to the individual plain-
tiffs. Id. The court further stated that because no special relationship existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant, no cause of action could be maintained. Id. at 523, 456 P.2d at
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 12
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/12
1989] POLICE LIABILITY
Application of the public duty and special duty rules in Indiana courts
381.
Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982). In Shore, the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut found that a police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's
decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of Connecticut. The case involved an accident in
which the plaintiff's decedent was killed by a drunk driver. Less than one hour prior to the
accident, a Town of Stonington police officer had warned the intoxicated motorist that he
should not drive. Id. at 150, 444 A.2d at 1381. The motorist told the officer he was stopping at
the V.F.W. to pick up his girlfriend. The officer left after telling the motorist to let his girl-
friend drive. Id. While refusing to allow an action against the officer and his employer, the
court did examine the approaches of other jurisdictions. The Connecticut court recognized that
some courts have recently refused to strictly interpret the public duty rule, yet the court re-
fused to follow the trend. Id. at 157, 444 A.2d at 1384. For additional analysis of the Shore
decision, see Note, Intoxicated Drivers, supra note 80, at 1059; Note, Government Liability,
supra note 15, at 512-13.
Other cases propose that because a special relationship has formed the special duty rule
applies, and this liability exists. The first case to so hold was a Massachusetts decision. Irwin v.
Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). In Irwin, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that municipal tort liability could be predicated on a police duty owed
to the motoring public for failing to remove drunk drivers from the road. The plaintiff brought
suit after a car driven by Fuller, an intoxicated driver, struck the Irwin automobile head-on.
Id. at 766, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. The accident left two passengers in the Irwin vehicle dead and
two other passengers seriously injured. A Town of Ware patrolman stopped Fuller ten minutes
prior to the accident for "driving too fast under the circumstances." Id. An eyewitness to the
traffic stop testified that while two Town of Ware police officers conferred (another Town of
Ware patrolman came to the site of the traffic stop), Fuller stood by his car swaying back and
forth and holding onto the car door to steady himself. Id. The court concluded that "a town or
city may be held liable in damages for the negligent failure of its police officers to remove from
the highway a motor vehicle operator who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor and who
subsequently causes injuries or death to other travelers." Id. at 772, 467 N.E.2d at 1310. See
also Suing the Police For Drunk Driving: A Trend?, 6 LAw. ALERT 470 (1987). Other courts
have followed Massachusetts' lead and have found police officers, and the municipalities for
which they work, liable for drunk driving accidents. Id.
Huhn v. Dixie Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 468 So. 2d 963
(Fla. 1985). The court in Huhn rejected the reasoning in Everton v. Willard, 426 So. 2d 996
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The Huhn court found that the City of Daytona Beach could be
held liable for the release of an intoxicated driver by two police officers. Id. at 71. The court
rejected the argument of the city that the city owed no duty to the plaintiff any different from
that owed to the general public, but based its decision largely on the theory that a police officer
is not exercising a discretionary function in enforcing laws. Id. at 77. For additional comment
regarding the Huhn decision, see Note, supra note 58, at 601; Fudge v. City of Kansas City,
239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986). In Fudge, the Kansas Supreme Court found that Kansas
City Police Officers owed a special duty to the victim of a drunk driving collision. Id. at 375,
720 P.2d at 1098. The court partially based its findings on Kansas City Police Department
General Order 79-44, which outlines procedures to be followed by Kansas City Police Officers
when dealing with intoxicated persons. Id. Additionally, the court held that this duty ripened
into an obligation because the police should have realized that taking the intoxicated person
into custody was necessary to protect third parties. Id. For additional discussion of the Fudge
decision, see Lambert, Governmental Liability: Municipal Police Liable For Negligent Failure
to Detain Drunk Driver, 29 A.T.L.A. REP. 294 (1986).
Kendrick v. City of Lake Charles, 500 So. 2d 866 (La. Ct. App. 1986). "A duty owed to
the public in general may be transformed into a duty owed to an individual through closeness
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has yielded inconsistent results. The case of Estate of Tanasijevich v. City
of Hammond,"8 provides a good example of how the public duty and spe-
cial duty rules are applied. The appellate court in Tanasijevich noted that
the police owed a duty to protect Tanasijevich's property from vandalism
and fire,109 but that this was a general duty owed to the public.' After
stating that a general duty alone will not give rise to liability, the court
considered whether a special relationship existed between Tanasijevich and
the Hammond Police because Tanasijevich had provided the police with in-
formation that they had requested."' Relying heavily on the desirability of
encouraging citizen cooperation with the police, the court found that a gen-
eral duty may become particularized to an individual where an individual
has worked with the police." 2 While Tanasijevich provides a good example
of an Indiana court's utilization of the special duty rule wherein a plaintiff
in proximity or time." Id. at 870. In Kendrick, the decedent died after being involved in a one
car accident. Prior to her death, the decedent was released from jail after being arrested for
driving under the influence. Immediately prior to her demise, the decedent was released from
jail after posting bond and given access to her vehicle despite the fact that she was still intoxi-
cated. Id. Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 128 N.H. 325, 514 A.2d 1257 (1986). In Weldy, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that police officers owe a duty to the general public
and that reasonable prudence dictates underage minors with alcohol should be detained. Id. at
331, 514 A.2d at 1260. For additional comment, see Lambert, Government Liability: Drunk
Drivers, 29 A.T.L.A. REP. 392 (1986). Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d
1257 (1987). In Bailey, the Supreme Court of Washington found a special relationship existed
between the victim of a drunk driver and the police officer who had stopped the drunk driver
but released him. The case involved a police officer who ordered Medley to enter his pickup
truck and leave the bar's parking lot where Medley had been involved in a fight. Id. at 265,
737 P.2d at 1258. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the officer should have realized Med-
ley's intoxication rendered him unfit to drive. The plaintiff in the case suffered severe injuries
when Medley made an illegal left turn in front of a motorcycle upon which the plaintiff rode
as a passenger. Id. The driver of the motorcycle died in the accident. Id. The Court of Appeals
of Washington had previously held that the public duty rule applied and that no cause of
action existed. Bailey v. Town of Forks, 38 Wash. App. 656, 688 P.2d 526 (1984).
108. 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081 (1978).
109. Tanasijevich had cooperated with the Hammond Police in their investigation of
various criminal activities after the police had approached him and asked for his assistance. Id.
at 670, 383 N.E.2d at 1082. As a result of this cooperation, Tanasijevich became the target of
criminal retaliation in the form of vandalism and fire damage to a building owned by his
estate. Id. at 670, 383 N.E.2d at 1083.
110. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the
city and noted that the police owed a duty to protect Tanasijevich's property but that the duty
was a general one owed to the public. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 673, 383 N.E.2d at 1084-85. See also Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (the Tanasijevich court relied heavily
on Schuster); Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 111. App. 2d 373, 380, 219 N.E.2d 147,
150 (1966), later app., 128 Ill. App. 2d 157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
919 (1971) (the police assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from
the suspects); Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969) (the
Tanasijevich court also cited Massengill, which has since been overruled).
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obtained relief, many cases exist wherein a plaintiff obtained no relief be-
cause no special relationship could be established." 3
A good example of a case wherein a plaintiff obtained no relief as a
consequence of the application of the special duty rule can be seen in Iva-
novich v. Doe," 4 a 1986 Indiana Appellate Court decision. In Ivanovich,
the appellate court held that a police officer who offered to take an intoxi-
cated minor home, but instead dropped him off and left him alone in the
freezing weather, owed no special duty toward the minor."15 The court rea-
soned that no liability existed because the police officer only owed a duty to
the general public and not to the individual.""
Comparing Tanasijevich and Ivanovich, the basis of liability appears
to be determined by the significance of the police-victim relationship. In
Tanasijevich, a reciprocal contract-like relationship existed, bringing the
case within a recognized exception to the public duty rule." 7 Alternatively,
in Ivanovich, an intoxicated minor who had less formal contact with the
police sustained injuries after relying on the officer's representation that he
would be taken home." 8 The distinction between the cases, wherein both
plaintiffs had contact with the police in situations where the police had
knowledge of the peril that the plaintiffs faced, typifies the incongruent re-
sults which often stem from application of the special duty rule."9
Justifications for the special duty rule stem primarily from a desire to
mitigate the harsh results of public duty rule application. 2 0 Many commen-
tators argue that acknowledging a special relationship where citizens have
113. See, e.g., Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (the duty to inves-
tigate a rape is one owed to the general public); City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d
1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (no special duty existed to put out a fire in the plaintiff's restau-
rant, which subsequently destroyed the entire premises); State v. Flanigan, 489 N.E.2d 1216
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (no special duty existed to provide traffic control or other protection for
customers walking to a flea market after parking their cars on the side of the road). But see
Roberts v. State, 159 Ind. App. 456, 307 N.E.2d 501 (1974) (public official in charge of a
prisoner owes a special duty to the prisoner to take reasonable precautions to preserve the
prisoner's health and safety).
114. 499 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
115. In the Ivanovich case, Ivanovich, a minor in an extreme state of intoxication, was
approached by two Gary Police Officers who told him to go home. Id. at 807. The officers
offered to give Ivanovich a ride after it became apparent that he could not walk. Instead of
taking Ivanovich home, one of the officers dropped Ivanovich off a few blocks from where he
had been picked up and left him in the freezing weather. Id. Ivanovich sued to recover dam-
ages for injuries suffered from exposure to the weather. Id. at 809.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 98, 108-12 and accompanying text.
118. Ivanovich v. Doe, 499 N.E.2d 806, 807 (1986).
119. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 14-15, 83 and accompanying text.
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cooperated with police encourages further citizen cooperation."' 1 Courts
have also justified application of the special duty rule on the theory that
because a citizen has provided information beneficial to the police, a recip-
rocal duty arises whereby the police should provide additional protection. 22
Furthermore, recognition of a special relationship within the informant-po-
lice context is seen by some commentators as merely adding to the types of
relationships traditionally recognized at common law as giving rise to an
affirmative duty to act.'
A final justification for the special duty rule is based on the traditional
tort principle of assumption of duty. An assumption of a duty occurs when
"one assumes to act, even though gratuitously, [and] may thereby become
subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." '124 Therefore, the
121. Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081
(1978). The court in Tanasijevich noted that:
The present-day unwillingness of citizens to "get involved" in the machinations of law
enforcement stems in part from their fear of reprisals similar to that which Tanasijevich
has alleged here. Were we to hold as a matter of law that the police had no duty to
protect Tanasijevich regardless of the likelihood that he or his family would suffer some
injury in retaliation for his cooperation in the criminal investigation, we would only rein-
force the public's reluctance to assist in the sometimes dangerous business of law
enforcement.
Id. at 674, 383 N.E.2d at 1085. See also Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154
N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
[l]n our view the public (acting in this instance through the City of New York) owes a
special duty to use reasonable care for the protection of persons who have collaborated
with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears they are in
danger due to their collaboration. If it were otherwise, it might well become difficult to
convince the citizen to aid and co-operate with the law enforcement officers.
Id. at 80, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269. See also Note, A Governmental Duty to
Protect the Citizen-The Schuster Case, 33 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 289, 297 (1959) (from a policy
standpoint the Schuster decision will encourage citizen cooperation with the police).
122. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 83, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 (1958) (when persons have aided in the apprehension of criminals "a recip-
rocal duty arises on the part of society to use reasonable care for their police protection"). See
generally Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383 N.E.2d 1081
(1978).
123. Comment, Municipality Liable for Negligent Failure to Protect Informer: The
Schuster Case, 59 CoL. L. REV. 479, 494 (1959) (the city has an affirmative duty to exercise
reasonable care toward those who aid in law enforcement).
124. Id. at 494. See also Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978) (the police department voluntarily assumed a duty when it began to
provide crossing guards at school intersections); Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at
604-05 (a plaintiff may recover in tort if the municipality assumed a duty towards the plaintiff
although owing no duty to the general public); Cracraft v. City of Saint Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 324 A:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to
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police may become subject to a duty to act if certain action is taken.125 For
example, if the police assume a duty to provide police protection but negli-
gently carry out that duty, liability will attach . 26
The special duty rule may soften the harshness of the public duty rule,
but it is subject to manipulation and distortion." 7 Continued application of
the special duty rule and its expansion to fit the needs of a changing society
indicate that the longer the special duty rule exists, the greater the uncer-
tainty surrounding the public duty rule becomes. 28 As one state court
noted, "close inspection of the doctrine and its myriad exceptions may well
reveal that the exceptions have virtually consumed the rule.' ' 2 9
The consumption of the public duty rule by special duty exceptions
indicates that courts generally are dissatisfied with the public duty rule. 30
This dissatisfaction resembles arguments advanced prior to the abolition of
sovereign immunity in many states, like Indiana, where the immunity had
been eroded with exceptions to such a point that only confusion re-
mained. 131 States that have overturned the special duty rule have refused to
further engage "in the speculative exercise of determining whether the
tortfeasor has a general duty to the injured party or if he had a specific
individual duty which means recovery.' 32 Despite the uncertainty created
by the continued application of the special duty rule, courts still use the
rule, and many more courts are using the rule within the context of police
failure to arrest intoxicated drivers. 33
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking if:
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of the other to the third person upon the undertaking.
Id. at 809.
125. Cf. Note, Police Protection, supra note 13, at 604 ("When the relationship be-
tween municipality and individual has created a justifiable reliance by the individual in police
protection, the municipality should be found to have assumed a duty to provide adequate po-
lice protection to him.").
126. See, e.g., Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178 Ind. App. 669, 383
N.E.2d 1081 (1978).
127. Cf. Note, supra note 70, at 730 (so long as the special relationship exception is
applied on an ad hoc basis, the scope of police duty remains undefined).
128. Id.
129. Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987).
130. Note, Duty to Protect, supra note 80, at 728 (the Washington Supreme Court's
continual effort to make exceptions to the public duty rule indicates its dissatisfaction with the
rule's application).
131. See Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972). "The [sovereign im-
munity] doctrine has been amended and eroded until the most that remains is an abstract and
confusing principle which finds no continuity between jurisdictions." Id. at 57, 284 N.E.2d at
734.
132. Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982).
133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. See also Hucko v. City of San Diego,
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The majority of states that have recognized the special duty exception
179 Cal. App. 3d 520, 224 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1986). In Hucko, the court felt that given Califor-
nia Supreme Court precedent on the issue, the trial court properly granted the defendant's
summary judgment motion in a case where an officer stopped a motorcyclist for speeding, but
failed to recognize that the motorcyclist was drunk, and failed to administer a field sobriety
test. Id. at 522, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The motorcyclist, whose blood alcohol content was
.24%, crashed ten minutes after the traffic stop and sustained serious injuries. Id. at 520, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 552. Lehto v. City of Oxnard, 171 Cal. App. 3d 285, 217 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1985).
The Lehto court held that the police officers who stopped a vehicle and released an intoxicated
driver owed no duty to the plaintiff who was a passenger in a vehicle later hit by that driver.
Id. Harris v. Smith, 157 Cal. App. 3d 100, 203 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1983). The Harris court held
that foreseeability alone is not enough to create a special relationship. Id. Where a sheriff
deputy stopped a speeding vehicle, administered field sobriety tests, and then released the
driver who shortly thereafter collided with the plaintiff, the deputy did not create the peril to
the plaintiff, take any affirmative action, increase the risk which already existed, and made no
promises upon which the plaintiff relied, therefore no liability existed. Id. at 105, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 546.
Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal. App. 3d 983, 194 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1983). The court in
Jackson found that a police officer's observation of conduct which may foreseeably create a
risk to others or an officer's temporary detention of a citizen does not create a special duty to
control the citizen's subsequent behavior. Id. at 986, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 556. Evett v. City of
Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court in Evett found that a police
officer who stopped an intoxicated driver for speeding and then released the driver could not be
held liable for a later accident in which plaintiff's decedent was killed. The court noted that
the police officer owed no duty to plaintiff's decedent different from that owed to any other
member of the public. Id. at 366. Drushella v. City of Elgin, No. 86 C 2307, memorandum op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1987). The Drushella court stated that a police officer had no special
duty to protect the plaintiff's decedent from an intoxicated driver released by the police after
being issued a speeding ticket. Id. The plaintiff failed to show that the municipality was
uniquely aware of the particular risk or danger to which the plaintiff was exposed, or that the
injury occurred while the plaintiff was under the direct and immediate control of the employee
of the municipality. Id. Marshall v. Ellison, 132 Il1. App. 3d 732, 477 N.E.2d 830 (1985). The
court in Marshall stated that foreseeability should not be confused with the concept of duty.
No special duty existed wherein the police had the responsibility to remove an intoxicated
individual from the roadway. Id. at 736, 477 N.E.2d at 833. Fusilier v. Russell, 345 So. 2d
543 (La. Ct. App. 1977). The Fusilier court held that no special duty existed in a case
wherein two sheriff deputies observed Russell in an intoxicated state in the parking lot of a bar
but did not arrest him. Id. The deputies did not see Russell enter his car or drive away from
the bar. Russell later ran into a vehicle in which Fusilier was a passenger. Id. at 544. Ashburn
v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986). The court in Ashburn found
that no special relationship existed between the police officer who failed to arrest/detain a
drunk driver and a pedestrian who lost a leg after being hit by the driver. The plaintiff failed
to show that the officer acted for the plaintiff's benefit or that the officer's action induced the
plaintiff's reliance. Id. at 622, 510 A.2d at 1085. Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 90 A.D. 2d
134, 457 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The court in Crosby found that no special
duty existed where an off-duty police officer observed an intoxicated person leave a party on a
motorcyle. The officer phoned in information to on-duty officers that people were driving away
from the party drunk. The motorcyclist struck and killed a pedestrian shortly after leaving the
party. Id. at 135, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 619. Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985).
The Barratt court found that no special relationship existed where a special police officer
working in a bar parking lot released three young men who were all intoxicated. Id. at 1221.
The officer released the three to the custody of the most sober driver, who failed to produce a
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/12
1989] POLICE LIABILITY 691
to the public duty rule have found that no special relationship exists be-
tween the police and the injured party in the drunk driving situation."M
Prompted by the immense public interest in the problem of drunk driving in
recent years,'3 5 some courts have found that a special relationship does exist
driver's license when asked and was in fact not a licensed driver. The young men unsuccess-
fully sued the officer after an accident in which the driver ran into a utility pole. Id. For
additional comment on Barratt see Note, Public Officer's Failure To Enforce Drunk-Driving
Statute Does Not Create Actionable Duty to Injured Motorist, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 282
(1986).
134. See, e.g., Schaffrath v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 160 Ill. App. 3d 999, 513 N.E.2d
1026 (1987). In Schaffrath, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that
a special relationship existed between a police officer and the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 1006,
513 N.E.2d at 1030. The Schaffrath case involved a police officer who had stopped a motorist
because of a loud muffler, but who did not issue the motorist a citation or arrest him. Id. at
1001, 513 N.E.2d at 1027. Approximately 28 minutes after being stopped by the police officer,
the motorist ran into a concrete abutment. Id. One passenger in the car was killed, while the
other passenger and the driver were injured. Id. Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 290,
514 N.E.2d 515 (1987). In Fessler, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a police officer who
encountered an intoxicated individual one hour prior to the individual's involvement in a
deadly accident owed no particular duty of care to the decedents and dismissed the action. Id.
Phillips v. City of Billings, 758 P.2d 772 (Mont. 1988). The court in Phillips found that no
duty existed toward the plaintiff based on a police officer's general duty to protect the travel-
ling public. Id. at 775. Phillips involved a situation where two police officers spoke to an
intoxicated motorist two hours before the motorist ran a red light and hit another vehicle. Id.
at 773-74. The officers did not arrest the motorist because they did not see him driving and
therefore believed that they had no probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 774. See also supra
notes 107, 133 and accompanying text.
135. Within the last ten years, drunk driving has become a major social issue in the
United States. Like many other states, Indiana has taken steps to address the problem. For
example, in 1982, Governor Orr established a task force to reduce drunk driving. In 1983, as a
result of task force efforts and the Indiana General Assembly's work, Indiana's drunk driving
laws were changed significantly. According to The Governor's Task Force to Reduce Drunk
Driving, the major points of the law are:
1. It is a crime to drive while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, a controlled substance
or a combination of the three. The penalty for driving while intoxicated is up to one year
in prison and a $5,000 fine. It is also now a crime to drive with a blood alcohol content
level that is .10 percent or greater. The penalty for this violation is up to 60 days in
prison and a $500 fine. If serious personal injury results from either crime, the crime
becomes a felony with prison time increased to 1-4 years, plus a $10,000 fine. If death
results, the prison time is increased to 2-8 years, plus a $10,000 fine.
2. A person's driving license will be automatically suspended if he/she either refuses a
police officer's request for a breathalyzer test or takes a breathalyzer and fails. A person
refusing the test will have his/her license suspended for one year by the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles. If a person takes a breathalyzer test and fails, his/her license is automatically
suspended for 180 days or until the case is decided by a court of law.
3. The absolute minimum amount of time a person is prohibited from driving is 30 days.
4. A person who continues to drive after his/her license has been suspended for a drunk
driving conviction will be automatically sentenced to a mandatory 60-day jail term.
5. After conviction of a drunk driving offense, a person must pay a $20 fee in order to
have his/her license reinstated. This money will be used to further law enforcement and
public education efforts.
Walker: Insulation Negligent Police Behavior in Indiana:  Why the Victims
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
692 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
between a police officer who released a drunk driver and the subsequent
victim of an accident caused by that driver. These courts have found that
liability may attach, but courts so holding are in the minority."' 6 Given
Indiana decisions such as Ivanovich v. Doe,"7 where the court held that no
special relationship existed when the police had contact with the plaintiff,
an Indiana court would be unlikely to find that a special relationship existed
between a police officer and the victim of a drunk driver where the officer
and victim have never met." 8 Not only does Indiana insulate arguably neg-
ligent acts of its police officers under the public duty and special duty rules,
the state has codified this shield of immunity in the Indiana Tort Claims
Act.1
3 9
D. The Indiana Tort Claims Act
With sovereign immunity gone, and the status of state immunity in
question, 40 the Indiana Legislature enacted the Indiana Tort Claims Act in
1973.'11 The Act immunizes police activity when a police officer engages in
"the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law," but
not if his action constitutes false arrest or imprisonment. 42 The most im-
portant Indiana case to interpret the police activity section of the Act is
The Governor's Task Force to Reduce Drunk Driving, Indiana Drunk Driving Fact Sheet
(available by writing to the Governor's Task Force to Reduce Drunk Driving, One American
Square, Suite 1055, P.O. Box 82072, Indianapolis, Indiana 46282).
The task force projects that 8,234 deaths and injuries have been prevented since the law
changed. A projected $113,000,000 savings to Indiana taxpayers resulted. Still, an estimated
268 Indiana residents died in alcohol related accidents in 1986 and more than 8,000 were
injured. Id. An Indiana State Police fact sheet indicates that drinking was the number one
circumstance contributing to fatal traffic accidents in Indiana. INDIANA ST. POLICE, 1986 IN-
DIANA TRAFFIC DEATHS 10 (1986).
All 50 states have now raised the drinking age to 21. McAllister, The Drunken Driving
Crackdown Is It Working?, A.B.A. J. Sept. 1, 1988, at 54. Additionally, in 1985, 223 laws
relating to driving while intoxicated were passed in 45 states. Id. at 55.
136. See supra notes 107, 133 and accompanying text.
137. 499 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
139. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-I to -19 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
140. Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972). See supra notes 58, 60
and accompanying text.
141. Note, Interpretation, supra note 37, at 711-12. See supra notes 54-59 and accom-
panying text.
142. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to -19 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). See supra note
33 (regarding the section of the Act providing immunity for police action). Many other states
have Tort Claims Acts. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 (Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4012 (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 6-904 (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85 para.
4-102 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 613.A1-6.13.A13 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 75-6101 to -6119 (1984 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 (1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-31-1 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
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Seymour National Bank v. State.14 3
Seymour National Bank involved an action against the State of Indi-
ana for the alleged negligence of an Indiana State Trooper who was in-
volved in an accident during a high speed chase.144 In applying the Tort
Claims Act to this case, the Indiana appellate court suggested that the case
be analyzed using traditional tort principles. 145 The court refused to ac-
knowledge that the legislature intended "enforcement" to shield negligent
and reckless conduct in enforcing the law. 46 In 1981, however, upon re-
viewing the appellate court's decision,147 the Indiana Supreme Court stated
that given the plain meaning of the word "enforcement," enforcing a law
included making an arrest; therefore, because the trooper was engaged in
an arrest,"48 the Tort Claims Act prevented suit."
4 9
The Indiana Supreme Court later granted rehearing on the case and
modified its original opinion.150 Upon rehearing, the majority explained that
if an employee's acts are so outrageous as to be incompatible with the duty
143. 384 N.E.2d 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), vacated, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1981),
modified, 428 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1127 (1982).
144. During the chase, wherein the suspect vehicle reached speeds far in excess of the
speed limit, the State Trooper, while reducing his speed near traffic, collided with a vehicle he
attempted to pass. The driver of the vehicle made a left hand turn into the path of the police
car. Id. at 1180.
145. The appellate court first decided that a two-pronged analysis had evolved. Thus, a
plaintiff would have to show:
(1) the officer was acting in a ministerial capacity; or
(2) the officer owed a private duty to the plaintiff to exercise due care.
Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (1979). The court decided that the
trooper owed a private duty to the plaintiff, and that his actions were ministerial; therefore, a
common law action existed. Id. at 1184-85. In reaching the decision that the trooper owed a
private duty to the plaintiff, the appellate court found that under INDIANA CODE § 9-4-1-25,
relating to the operation of emergency vehicles, there was a duty imposed by statute on the
state trooper. Id. at 1189. This analysis tends to indicate that such a finding could be made in
regard to the duty of a police officer to arrest or detain a drunk driver when a statute to so
arrest is involved. Even if such a finding was made by a court, this would merely place the
duty within a special duty exception to the public duty rule. The plaintiff would still face
proving breach of a duty, proximate cause, and damage to be successful in an action. The
Indiana Supreme Court did not address the issue in its subsequent rulings on the case. See
infra note 152 and accompanying text. Furthermore, unlike the statute relating to emergency
vehicle operation, no Indiana statute exists that regulates police behavior mandating the arrest
of drunk drivers.
146. Id. at 1186.
147. 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1981) (DeBruler, J., and Hunter, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1226.
149. Id. But see Justice Hunter's dissent, where he proposes that this interpretation of
"enforcement" means that Indiana has returned to the notion that "the King can do no
wrong." Such blanket immunity prevents recovery from actions of gross negligence or reckless-
ness by police officers. Id. at 1227.
150. 438 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1981) (DeBruler, J., and Hunter, J., dissenting).
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undertaken, no duty is performed and the act is thus beyond the scope of
employment.' 51 In all other respects the majority affirmed its prior deci-
sion.152 However, the dissenting opinion argued that the wording of the stat-
ute was ambiguous, called upon the legislature to re-examine the wording
of the Act, and astutely noted that "troublesome questions surrounding the
issue before us lie ahead."'53
Unfortunately the dissent's vision of troublesome questions and inequi-
table results in future cases has materialized. As one commentator has indi-
cated, the police immunity portion of the Indiana Tort Claims Act is "an
inadequate attempt to address the issue of immunity in a law enforcement
setting."'' 5 Recent Indiana cases insulate police action from detailed scru-
tiny by applying the Tort Claims Act. 55 While no cases regarding the fail-
ure of the police to arrest or detain intoxicated drivers have been addressed
under the Act, 5 " if the words of the Act are taken literally, 57 the failure to
enforce drunk driving laws by a police officer in Indiana would not be ac-
151. Id. at 204.
152. Id. at 204-05.
153. Id. at 206. Note, Interpretation, supra note 37, at 719 (discussing Justice Hunter's
dissent).
154. Note, Interpretation, supra note 37, at 721-25 (discussing additional problems re-
sulting from use of the statute as it exists).
155. See McFarlin v. State, 524 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In McFarlin, an
individual was struck by a car while assisting a state trooper placing flares at an accident
scene. The court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the state trooper's
actions were within the scope of enforcing the law. Id. at 809. City of Gary v. Cox, 512
N.E.2d 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In Cox the plaintiff was shot by a prisoner who escaped
from a hospital while being guarded by a Gary Police Officer. Id. at 453. The Indiana Appel-
late Court held that the police officer involved was engaged in the enforcement of the law, and
that therefore the City of Gary was immune from suit. Id. at 454. Indiana State Police Dep't
v. Swaggerty, 507 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In Swaggerty, a state trooper enroute to
assist a Gary Police Officer pursuing a suspect collided with the plaintiff's vehicle at an inter-
section. The provisions of the Tort Claims Act applied to the trooper's activity because he was
acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 652. Crews v. Brockman, 510 N.E.2d 707
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In Crews, a police officer enroute to a domestic disturbance collided with
the plaintiff's vehicle after the officer ran a red light. Since the officer was acting within the
scope of his employment while enforcing a law, no liability existed. Id. at 711. Weber v. City
of Fort Wayne, 511 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In Weber, a police officer struck the
plaintiff's car while enroute to an accident. The officer was immune from suit under the Tort
Claims Act because he was in the process of enforcing a law. Id. at 1080. Indiana State Police
v. May, 469 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The Indiana State Police were not held liable
under the Indiana Tort Claims Act when they used tear gas to flush a fleeing murder suspect
from May's home and caused damage to the home. Id.
156. No published Indiana case has been found. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
157. If the sentence in paragraph (7) is taken literally, that "(7) the adoption and en-
forcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law," (emphasis added) the same result as in
Seymour Nat'l. Bank is likely.
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tionable in tort.158
If the Officer Jones scenario in the introduction occurred in Indiana,
the result would be as follows.159 Applying the words "or failure to adopt or
enforce a law"'160 of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, 6 'L a court might conclude
that the Act effectively immunizes from suit both Officer Jones and the
municipality for which he works. Given the dissent in Seymour National
Bank, 62 one could argue that the words of the Act as applied to an omis-
sion, here the failure to enforce Indiana driving while intoxicated laws, are
ambiguous and the Act should not apply.' 63 Given the majority decision in
Seymour National Bank, however, any Indiana court faced with the ques-
tion would most likely reject this argument and apply the Tort Claims
Act.16 4
If a court held that the Indiana Tort Claims Act did not apply,6 5 it
would then have to decide whether the public duty and special duty rules
applied.'6 6 In applying the public duty rule, analysis of the special duty
exception as applied in Indiana indicates that the relationship between the
victim and the officer does not rise to the level of a special relationship.' 6'
Therefore, under the earlier stated scenario, Officer Jones would not be lia-
ble for the Does' injuries.
Alternatively, a court could reason that because driving while intoxi-
cated is such a serious public policy issue in Indiana," 8 the Does should not
be without remedy. Thus, a court could attempt to fit the situation into a
special duty exception recognized by other state courts. Such a court could
hold that because the Does' injuries resulted from a clearly foreseeable se-
ries of events, and a special relationship existed between Officer Jones and
158. The state trooper and State of Indiana in Seymour Nat'! Bank were not held liable.
Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1981). In Seymour Nat'! Bank, the
Indiana Supreme Court placed heavy emphasis on the plain meaning of the word "enforce-
ment" in arriving at the final outcome and in interpreting the meaning of the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 33.
161. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to -19 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
162. 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (Ind. 1981) (DeBruler, J., and Hunter, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. Seymour Nat'l Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
166. See supra notes 60-139 and accompanying text.
167. Examination of Indiana decisions wherein the public duty and special duty rules
have been applied indicate that this would be the probable outcome. Specifically, in consider-
ing Indiana cases such as Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 108 Ind. App. 669, 383
N.E.2d 1081 (1978), Ivanovich v. Doe, 499 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), and Sports, Inc.
v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), it appears that the plaintiff would be without
a remedy. See also supra notes 6, 108-17 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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the Does, that Officer Jones owed a duty to remove Mr. Smith from the
road. 69 This alternative, while theoretically possible, is highly unlikely
given the current state of Indiana law.Y70 Thus, under Indiana law, there
are a number of possible outcomes to the Officer Jones problem, all more
complex than a traditional tort analysis, and all likely to insulate Officer
Jones from liability.' 7'
III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
An action initiated by the victims of a drunk driver negligently re-
leased by a police officer in Indiana would be barred by the application of
the public duty and special duty rules and the Indiana Tort Claims Act.172
Given the important public policy concerns surrounding the driving while
intoxicated issue, Indiana courts should abolish the public duty and special
duty rules rather than perpetuate the confusion surrounding the application
of the rules and their use as another form of sovereign immunity.17 3 Courts
could then engage in more rigorous analysis using traditional negligence
principles, while encouraging legislative thought regarding means other
than the Indiana Tort Claims Act to pursue policy objectives.174
Given the fact that a court faced with this issue would probably apply
the Indiana Tort Claims Act, the court should reject the public duty and
special duty rules when presented with a case where the rules could be ap-
plied.' 75 The following section of this note examines the failure of police to
arrest or detain intoxicated drivers in states where the public duty rule has
been abolished.'76 Additionally, this section examines an appropriate stan-
169. See supra notes 107, 133.
170. See supra notes 118-20, 138 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 105-70 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 60-158 and accompanying text.
173. See Burleigh, DUI since MADD, STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 1989, at 7. Certainly
there are many public policy concerns surrounding this issue, chief among them being that
23,990 people died in alcohol-related accidents on American highways in 1986. Id. Since the
push against drunk driving began in 1982, all 50 states have raised the drinking age to 21, and
most have adopted a per se level of intoxication of .10%. Id. For additional comment regard-
ing the public duty rule as another form of sovereign immunity, see supra notes 85, 87 and
accompanying text.
174. By taking this step, courts would be engaging in what professors Tarr & Porter
have described as agenda setting policymaking, or forcing political authorities to reform public
policies by upsetting existing policies. STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM xvi-xvii (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982). The attention within this action fo-
cuses on unacceptable inequities in current policy. Id. See infra note 256 and accompanying
text for additional discussion regarding agenda setting policy making.
175. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
176. As previously noted, the public duty rule has been abolished in a number of states
including Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Colorado abol-
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dard of negligence to be used by Indiana courts in place of the public duty
and special duty rules and the Indiana Tort Claims Act.1 "7 Finally, this
section discusses the abolition of the portions of the Indiana Tort Claims
Act which insulate negligent police action from liability. 7 8
A. Abolishing the Public Duty Rule
A number of states have abolished the public duty and special duty
rules .1 9 In states where the rules no longer exist, the failure to arrest or
detain an intoxicated motorist subjects the police officer and his employer to
possible suit under ordinary negligence principles. 8 0 Rather than attempt-
ing to squeeze such a situation into a recognized special duty rule excep-
tion, or to further distort the public duty rule by creating a new excep-
tion, 8 ' these states no longer recognize these rules.182 An excellent example
of the abolition of the public duty rule is found in a recent Colorado Su-
preme Court decision 8 3 where the court not only examined a case using
traditional negligence principles, but also took the further step of eliminat-
ing the public duty rule.'8 "
Leake v. Cain,'8 5 a 1986 Colorado Supreme Court decision, involved a
wrongful death action initiated by the parents of two children struck and
ished the public duty rule within the context of a case involving the failure of the police to
arrest or detain an intoxicated person. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986). See infra
notes 179-202 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 209-51 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
179. See Note, Government Liability, supra note 15, at 520 ("there are a small but
growing minority of jurisdictions that have explicitly rejected the public duty doctrine"). See
supra notes 89, 176 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986) ("Having discarded the
concept that the existence and extent of the police officers' duty is dependent on status, we now
analyze the duty question by applying conventional tort principles."); Note, Government Lia-
bility, supra note 15, at 508 (several jurisdictions have abandoned the public duty doctrine in
favor of a traditional negligence analysis). See supra notes 89, 119 and accompanying text.
181. As previously indicated, there are a number of recognized exceptions to the public
duty rule which take form as the special duty rule. For example, in Washington, courts have
identified four situations wherein a governmental unit owes a special duty of care to certain
individuals rather than a general duty of care to the public. Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108
Wash. 2d 262, 268, 737 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1987). See also supra notes 97-105 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (overruling Massengill
v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), which involved the failure of the police
to arrest or detain an intoxicated individual); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986)
(the court found that the public duty/special duty rule was.no longer viable in Wyoming in a
case involving an accident where the plaintiff's decedent was killed). See supra note 107.
183. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
184. Id.
185. 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
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killed by a vehicle driven by a drunk teenager, Ralph Crowe.186 Prior to the
accident, city police investigated a large party involving intoxicated teenag-
ers. 1 7 While at the party, the officers handcuffed and detained Ralph
Crowe, who had become loud and disruptive.' 88 Thereafter, Eddie Crowe,
Ralph's younger brother, approached the officers and asked for permission
to take his brother home.8 9 After noting that Eddie had a valid driver's
license and appeared sober, the officers released Ralph to Eddie's cus-
tody.190 Ralph and Eddie then switched positions so that Ralph now
drove.' The brothers then drove to a site where the party that the police
had disbanded reassembled. 92 Ralph, with a blood alcohol content of .20%,
struck six pedestrians at the new party site, killing two children. 9"
The parents of the deceased children sued the police officers who had
responded to the party as well as their employer. 9 4 The plaintiffs specifi-
cally alleged that the police officers negligently released Ralph Crowe to his
brother Eddie. 98 In deciding the issue of whether the officers owed a duty
to the deceased children, the Colorado Supreme Court thoroughly ex-
amined the public duty rule. 96 The court reasoned that the benefits of the
rule failed to justify the problems associated with its use. 97 Additionally,
the court rejected the idea that abolition of the rule would result in interfer-
ence with governmental operations. 98 Noting that the rule operated in
much the same way as sovereign immunity, the court rejected the rule.' 99
After rejecting the rule, the court analyzed the case using traditional
186. Id. at 154.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (the legal presumption of intoxication in Colorado at the time of the incident
was .10% or 0.10 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood).
194. Id.
195. Id. The trial court, in granting the officers' and the city's motions for summary
judgment, relied on the public duty rule. Id. The court reasoned that the officers owed no
special duty to the deceased children. Id. The appellate court reversed this decision and held
that the officers and the city were not immune from suit. Cain v. Leake, 695 P.2d 798 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984). The appellate decision relied heavily on the theory that the officers had not
made a discretionary decision to release Ralph Crowe. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155
(Colo. 1986). The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the appellate court failed to address the
trial court's reliance on the public duty and special duty rules. Id.
196. Leake, 720 P.2d at 155-57. The court explored both the general history of the
public duty rule and its development in Colorado. Additionally, the court detailed the expan-
sion of the special duty rule and its justifications and criticisms. Id. at 158-60.
197. Id. at 160.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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negligence principles. 00 The court decided that the police officers who re-
strained Ralph at the party and their employer, the City of Commerce
City, could not be held liable.2 0 1 The court reasoned that any duty owed to
the plaintiff's decedent by the officers began and ended at the party because
the officers discharged their duty when they released Ralph Crowe to the
custody of his younger brother.2 0 2
The Colorado decision is significant because the court eliminated fur-
ther application of the public duty and special duty rules, thus removing the
confusion surrounding their application. The court also refused to further
confuse the rules by manipulating this fact pattern into an existing or new
exception to the rules. The decision permits Colorado courts to utilize tradi-
tional negligence analysis in deciding cases involving police officers and
their employing governmental unit.2 03
Applying the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court to the Officer
Jones hypothetical,2 0 4 both Officer Jones and the municipality could be held
liable for damages. Since Officer Jones stopped Mr. Smith for a traffic vio-
lation and subsequently determined that Mr. Smith was highly intoxicated,
Officer Jones owed a duty to the public to remove Mr. Smith from the
highway. Therefore, Officer Jones owed a duty to Mr. and Mrs. Doe to
protect them from Mr. Smith. Officer Jones breached this duty by failing to
adequately detain or arrest Mr. Smith.
Officer Jones' release of Mr. Smith proximately caused the injuries to
Mr. and Mrs. Doe.205 The Does suffered damages as a result of Officer
200. Id.
201. Id. at 163. Because the respondents failed to establish that the police officers or the
City of Commerce City owed a duty to their decedents, they failed to establish a prima facie
case of negligence, and therefore no liability could attach. Id. See generally Comment, supra
note 37, at 524. By using a traditional negligence analysis, police action would be scrutinized
under traditional proximate cause and foreseeability principles, thus being held to a standard
of due care. Id.
202. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 162 (Colo. 1986). Commentators have taken various
positions regarding the Leake decision. For example, one recent note supported the Leake
decision and Colorado's abrogation of the public duty doctrine, stating that such a move "en-
hances justice, equity, and the relationship between the police and the public. ... Note,
Government Liability, supra note 15, at 540. Yet another commentator has argued that the
Leake decision goes too far in narrowing governmental immunity. Note, Leake v. Cain; Aboli-
tion of Governmental Immunity in Colorado, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 733 (1988). The author
further asserts that a traditional tort analysis, encompassing a forseability and proximate
cause analysis, serves as a weak replacement for the public duty rule. Id. at 748. Additionally,
the author notes that the Leake decision goes against the legislative position on the issue. Id. at
750.
203. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 162 (Colo. 1986).
204. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
205. This note will not attempt to enter a detailed analysis of proximate causation. Prox-
imate cause has been defined as a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and
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Jones' actions because, had Officer Jones removed Mr. Smith from the
roadway, the accident would not have occurred. Therefore, Officer Jones
and the municipality for which he works could be held liable because Of-
ficer Jones failed to discharge his duty.
The results in the Officer Jones scenario and the Colorado Supreme
Court decision are different. 06 Yet, the difference in result adds further
support to this analysis. In the Colorado decision, the court found that the
police officers could not be held liable because they discharged their duty at
the first party by releasing Ralph to his younger brother. 0 7 Therefore,
while a court could find liability using this analysis in the Officer Jones
the resulting injury. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 30, at 165. Continued application of the
public duty and special duty rules instead of traditional tort analysis raises a number of ques-
tions. For example, why should courts be concerned with the public duty and special duty rules
when the doctrine of proximate cause has provided a traditional legal means of limiting liabil-
ity despite technical factual causation? There does not appear to be any basis for using the
public duty and special duty rules in place of a traditional proximate cause analysis other than
to perpetuate governmental immunity in a common law form. Two recent state supreme court
decisions, wherein the courts abolished the public duty and special duty rules in their respec-
tive states and yet still found no liability should attach to the police activities involved, demon-
strate this proposition. See DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo. 1986) (the officers'
actions were not the proximate cause of the accident); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo.
1986) (the police owed a duty to the plaintiff's but discharged the duty). One commentator
has even suggested that "the causation requirement of a traditional negligence scheme would
function as a self-limiting principle to keep municipal liability within reasonable limits." Note,
Municipal Liability for Negligent Enforcement of Driving While Intoxicated Statutes: Mas-
sachusetts Leads the Way in Irwin v. Town of Ware, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 239, 262
(1984).
Additionally, the public duty and special duty rules do not add anything to a negligence
analysis that a proximate cause analysis would not address. Indeed, courts adhering to the
public duty and special duty rules will never reach the issue of proximate causation if the
determination is made that no duty exists. The question of negligence is generally a question of
fact for the jury to decide. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 765, 467 N.E.2d 1292,
1305 (1984). Given the fact that every incident contains numerable causes, the court in a
negligence action does not focus on what may be determined to be the sole cause of an occur-
rence, but rather attempts to determine whether the "defendant's conduct played such part as
to make him responsible." GREEN, PROXIMATE CAUSE 134 (1927). Thus, use of the public duty
and special duty rules not only fails to the properly dispose of a negligence action, they in fact
take away from the analysis by prohibiting the causation question from being addressed.
Having concluded, as did Judge Keating in his dissent in Riss v. City of New York, 22
N.Y.2d 579, 591, 240 N.E.2d 860, 866, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 890 (1968) (Keating, J., dissent-
ing), that "[t]o deny liability on ordinary principles of tort law offers a far better approach to
the question of municipal tort liability than the fiction that there is no duty running to the
general public," why impose the para-professional standard in the intoxicated motorist situa-
tion when traditional proximate causation analysis might suffice? Unlike the public duty and
special duty rules, the para-professional standard, as later proposed in this note, provides an
additional basis from which a court may proceed with its negligence analysis, instead of
prohibiting the analysis from ever occurring.
206. See supra notes 4, 183-203 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 190, 200 and accompanying text.
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situation, the Colorado decision, wherein the police officers and their em-
ployer were not held liable, demonstrates that use of this analysis will not
trigger automatic liability. The flexibility of this approach could be applied
in many states which currently adhere to the public duty and special duty
rules, including Indiana s.2 0
B. Negligence Analysis
1. Alternative Negligence Standards
The use of a traditional negligence analysis within the context of police
and governmental liability for police action has been proposed in various
forms by both courts and commentators. 20 9 Some advocates of the use of a
negligence analysis claim that a due care standard should be applied. 10
The due care approach examines police actions in light of what an ordinary
prudent person would have done given the same circumstances. 211 Some
proponents of the due care standard believe that current police standards
could be used to determine when due care exists.2 12 Even though the due
care standard is an improvement over the use of the public and special duty
rules, the standard is an inadequate solution in Indiana given the state's
concern with encouraging vigorous law enforcement.2 1 3
208. See supra notes 60-139 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Note, supra note 70 (advocating the use of a gross negligence standard);
Note, supra note 205, at 264 (the public duty rule should be discarded and a negligence or
professional standards model should be used instead); Note, supra note 58, at 622 (not advo-
cating a standard, but questioning whether a police officer should be subject to a professional's
standard of care); Comment, The Special Duty Rule Should Be Discarded, supra note 37, at
524 (use of a negligence standard would be appropriate and not impose an absolute duty on a
police department to enforce all laws or protect all citizens); Note, Failure to Prevent Crime,
supra note 13, at 840 (containing an excellent discussion of alternative liability approaches for
police liability for failure to prevent crime, and advocating the professional standards model as
"impos[ing] on the police a duty of reasonable protection while at the same time affording
sufficient deference to police discretion").
210. See Note, Interpretation, supra note 37, at 724. One commentator advocated the
application of a due care standard instead of blanket immunity for police as provided by the
Indiana Tort Claims Act. Use of the standard was seen as a way to balance concerns of the
Indiana legislature regarding the encouragement of vigorous law enforcement and protecting
citizens from negligent acts of such law enforcement officials. Id. Note, supra note 205, at 261.
"Reliance upon objective standards as evidence of due care would permit judicial review of
police activity, while affording a reasonable degree of police discretion." Id.
211. See Note, Interpretation, supra note 37, at 724-25. The ordinary prudent person
standard is also referred to as the reasonable person standard. W. KEErON, supra note 11, §
32, at 174.
212. Comment, The Special Duty Rule Should Be Discarded, supra note 37, at 524. A
breach of a general duty to provide police protection would exist if formal standards were
violated. The author further noted that self-serving standards would be invalid on their face.
Id. at 525 n.125.
213. "The Indiana General Assembly's policy favor[s] vigorous law enforcement." Note,
1989]
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Some of those who have rejected the use of a due care standard to
judge the police liability problem have proposed the use of a gross negli-
gence standard. 214 Gross negligence has been defined as signifying more
than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious indiffer-
ence to the consequences. 215 Thus, gross negligence differs from ordinary
negligence only in degree, not in kind.216 The gross negligence standard has
gained support from those who feel that victims of official or police negli-
gence should receive compensation, but that a standard that would not im-
pede performance of risky work carried out in good faith would enhance
police effectiveness.117 Advocates of the gross negligence standard also as-
sert that since grossly negligent police acts further no public interest, such
acts should not be protected.2 1 8
While adoption of a gross negligence standard in place of the public
and special duty rules appears to be a sound solution, a better alternative
exists. The gross negligence standard has been criticized as failing to pro-
vide victim compensation for police misconduct which fails to reach the
level of gross negligence.219 Moreover, because gross negligence has never
been clearly differentiated from simple negligence, the standard would be
difficult to apply, would produce widely varying results, and would be sub-
ject to manipulation. 20 Like proponents of the due care standard, advocates
of the gross negligence standard point to police department operation
manuals and the conduct of other departments as guides from which to
judge police conduct.221 By looking to such materials as evidence of negli-
gence, the determination of a professional standard ultimately results.
Interpretation, supra note 37, at 725.
214. See, e.g., Note, supra note 70, at 735-37 (advocating the use of a gross negligence
standard).
215. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 34, at 212. Gross negligence has been said to have no
generally accepted meaning, which has prompted many courts to avoid the use of such a stan-
dard. Id.
216. Id.
217. The gross negligence standard is a compromise between providing compensation for
victims of official wrongdoing and providing adequate public service. Note, supra note 70, at
735.
218. No justification exists for insulating grossly negligent police conduct from liability.
Id. at 737.
219. "The system would fail to provide compensation and promote efficiency in the
many cases in which police culpability rises only to the level of simple negligence." Note,
Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 837.
220. Id. (a "fuzzy line" separates simple and gross negligence, making a gross negli-
gence standard difficult to administer).
221. Good faith effort is a defense to gross negligence, and one way to measure good
faith is to look to departmental procedures, regulations, and practice to judge compliance. See
Note, supra note 70, at 736.
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2. The Professional Negligence Standard
A professional standard of care may be used to determine negligence if
a person possesses superior knowledge, skill, or other attributes above that
of the ordinary citizen. 2 Professional persons must use the degree of care
which is reasonable in light of their superior knowledge, skills, or train-
ing. " ' The law requires that the conduct of a person deemed "professional"
be consistent with that level of ability.22 ' If a professional person under-
takes a task or duty, he must both exercise reasonable care and possess the
minimum qualifications of a person within that particular profession.2 5 The
professional standards model has been applied most frequently in cases in-
volving doctors, lawyers, and clergymen.2
Controversy over whether a professional standards model should be ap-
plied to police conduct stems from a number of sources. Traditionally the
professional standards model has been applied to a very limited number of
professionals. 2 Also, police analysts have long debated the extent of pro-
fessionalism within police departments.22 8 Recent developments within po-
222. W. KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 185.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Keeton also notes that the standard may be applied to persons who have superior
skills or training than that of an ordinary person. Id. The traditional model of a professional to
which the standard has been applied, has not, however, been extended to many groups. As one
author noted, law, medicine, and theology have historically been noted as the "three learned
professions." Brannon, Professional Development of Law Enforcement Personnel, in POLICE
AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS: A SOURCEBOOK 302, 303 (1968).
By profession such as the ministry, medicine, law, teaching, we mean much more than a
calling which has a certain traditional dignity and certain other callings which in recent
times have achieved or claim a like dignity. . . . The term refers to a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public service is the primary
purpose.
Id. Roady & Anderson, Introduction, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE vi n.9 (1960) (citing
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)). A few commentators
have advocated the professional standards model as a replacement for the public duty rule.
See, e.g., Note, Failure to Prevent Crime, supra note 13, at 838-40. Note, supra note 205, at
261, 264. In the latter note, the author advocates the use of either the professional standards
model or the use of a negligence standard, but believed that "[t]he use of a negligence stan-
dard would afford a measure of police discretion and would broaden the scope of judicial
review of police beyond that afforded under the professional standards model."
228. The professional model of a police agency developed largely around the notion that
operational efficiency was the key to a successful agency. This model stressed clear organiza-
tion, personnel management, mobility, better equipment and technology, and improved train-
ing. During the 1960s, major advancements were made in technological and operational areas,
but development of the professional model during this time occurred unevenly and did not
reach many departments. H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 2-3 (1977). Professional-
ization efforts have most often lead to departmental or staff professionalization but not line
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licing do, however, point toward further professionalization of the police,
thus making the professional standards model not only a more appropriate
standard, but also a more workable model within the context of determining
police negligence and subsequent liability. Discussion by police administra-
tors regarding recent developments in policing also demonstrates the move-
ment toward further professionalism. 29
One of the most visible movements toward standardization and profes-
sionalization of police practices in recent years has been the accreditation of
police departments. The accreditation process, similar to that through
which colleges and universities pass, essentially involves a self-assessment
program coupled with the development of departmental standards to meet
Accreditation Commission requirements. 30 The Accreditation Commission
reviews all steps taken by the candidate department before the police de-
partment can be accredited.2 31 While controversy exists over the accredita-
tion program, 232 many police chiefs and executives see it as a useful tool in
enhancing the quality of police service delivered, in the legitimization of
officer professionalization. Reiss, Professionalization of the Police, in POLICE AND COMMU-
NITY RELATIONS: A SOURCEBOOK 215, 224 (1968). Police departments are actually comprised
of persons in many different occupations, from clerical and maintenance to professional and
technical. The patrol function is comprised of aspects which are both technical and profes-
sional. Reiss also discusses the areas in which a patrolman must exercise professional judg-
ment, how such decisions resemble decisions made by other professionals, and the role of the
patrolman in the criminal justice system. Id.
See also Brannon, supra note 227, at 311, 315. Brannon states that police work deserves
the status of a profession in American society. Brannon outlines steps which might be under-
taken to improve the professional status of the police, including a discussion of accreditation
and a proposal for a Uniform Law Enforcement Examination Act. Id. J. AHERN, POLICE IN
TROUBLE 176 (1972). Ahern notes that: "The policeman's task, as it is now performed is by
definition the kind of work that is performed in our society by professionals." Id. For discus-
sion of the early development toward police professionalism, see Deutsch, From Flatfoot to
Professional, in THE POLICE 125 (G. Leinwand ed. 1972).
229. See infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
230. "Accreditation, in a general sense, can be thought of both as a process and as a
status. Accreditation is a process by which agencies bring themselves into compliance with a
body of established standards." Remarks by Gerald Williams at the International Association
of Chiefs of Police Conference, Accreditation: Impact on Police Departments, POLICE CHIEF,
Mar. 1987, at 39.
231. "Compliance is subsequently verified by a recognized accrediting authority." Id.
232. Remarks by William J. Bratton at the International Association of Chiefs of Police
Conference, Accreditation: Impact on Police Departments, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 1987, at 38
(the accreditation process is costly, time consuming, and controversial). Compare Medeiros,
Accreditation: Expectations Met, POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1987, at 14 (accreditation is a workable
management tool for excellence) and Nicholson, Accreditation is Progress, POLICE CHIEF,
May 1987, at 20 (accreditation is a self evaluation process needed by professional police agen-
cies, and legitimizes the claim of any department that it is a professional organization) with
Franks, Accreditations Progress or Regression?, POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1987, at 15 (evaluation of
police service as professional should not come from adherence to accreditation standards, but
from public reaction).
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policing as a profession, and as a step toward further establishment of, and
reflection concerning, currently accepted police procedures and practices. 33
Imposition of higher educational standards has been recognized as a
method of upgrading police performance since 1931.124 In 1967, the Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice recom-
mended that eventually all police personnel should be required to have a
baccalaureate degree. 35 While police departments are far from reaching
this goal, many departments require that new recruits possess specified
amounts of college level course work.2 3 6 Similarly, many departments offer
incentive pay to officers who have obtained degrees or advanced training.2 7
Additionally, the increased utilization of in-service training for officers by
police departments points toward an increase in training and skill develop-
ment for a greater number of officers. While the number of annually re-
quired hours of in-service training varies widely between departments, some
states are enacting legislation which requires a mandatory number of train-
ing hours per year for officers. 38 Thus, the increase in both education and
in-service training for police indicates a strong movement toward further
professionalization.
Finally, some states have initiated licensing procedures as a mode of
legitimizing the police function in society. Licensing involves the fulfillment
of specified requirements to become a police officer within the state.23
Some states currently require officers to meet specified requirements in ad-
233. Nicholson, Accreditation is Progress, POLICE CHIEF, May 1987, at 20; Nicholson,
Accreditation: Impact on Police Departments, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 1987, at 38-41.
234. L. HOOVER, POLICE EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CURRICULA 2 (1975).
235. Id.
236. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LISTING SERVICE, THE POLICE EMPLOYMENT GUIDE 28,
49, 112, 120, 122, 128, 132, 142, 230, 621 (1982). For example, the Scottsdale, Arizona;
Berkeley, California; San Mateo, California; Sunnyvale, California; Vallejo, California; Whit-
tier, California; Arvada, Colorado; Lakewood, Colorado; Boise, Idaho; and Dallas, Texas Po-
lice Departments all require some college work before an applicant will be considered for
employment.
237. Id. at 21, 25, 26, 47, 134, 154, 186, 212, 264, 267, 634. For example, the Mesa,
Arizona; Little Rock, Arkansas; Anchorage, Alaska; Phoenix, Arizona; Aurora, Colorado;
Greenwich, Connecticut; Hialeah, Florida; Athens, Georgia; Evansville, Indiana; Indianapolis,
Indiana; and Houston, Texas Police Departments all provide educational incentive pay for
officers. These lists are by no means exhaustive.
238. Discussion of proposed legislation mandating an annual amount of in-service train-
ing each year for each police officer in the state has occurred in Texas. Telephone conversation
with Sally A. Beels, Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Education (Nov.
1, 1987). The effectiveness of certain forms of in-service training limited to lectures in a for-
mal classroom setting has been criticized as being unproductive and costly. Increased emphasis
on college level programs for police is seen as a more effective means of upgrading personnel.
H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 228, at 278-79.
239. Texas is an example. Telephone conversation with Sally A. Beels, Texas Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education (Nov. 1, 1987).
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dition to passing a state licensing exam. For example, in Texas a police
officer must meet all standards prescribed by law and pass the Texas Com-
mission of Law Enforcement Standards and Education exam before being
permanently licensed as a peace officer.24
C. Proposed Standard For Indiana: A Para-Professional Standard
Use of a professional standard to determine police negligence, and re-
sultant liability for a governmental unit, is enhanced by the general devel-
opment and standardization in the police profession.241 Courts have turned
to police experts, manuals, and departmental orders in the past to deter-
mine the appropriateness of police behavior.242 The adoption of a profes-
sional standards model in place of frequently random application of these
touchstone guidelines is appropriate. The application of the public duty and
special duty rules and the Indiana Tort Claims Act in cases involving the
failure of the police to arrest or detain intoxicated motorists would leave a
plaintiff with no remedy. The adoption of a para-professional standard in
place of the public duty and special duty rules and the Indiana Tort Claims
Act would provide a workable model for Indiana courts faced with this
situation.
Like departments elsewhere in the United States, a number of police
departments in Indiana have been accredited, while others are working to-
ward accreditation. 4 Similarly, many Indiana departments are increasing
the number of in-service training schools for officers and are working to-
ward modernization and professionalization of police personnel and their
respective departments. However, many factors indicate that policing in In-
diana has not reached a level where a pure professional standard is capable
of application. First, Indiana does not license officers. Second, Indiana is
not dominated by a few highly professional major metropolitan depart-
ments. Third, the state does not require a certain number of in-service
training hours per year per officer. Finally, the state currently allows any
person hired by a police department one year in which to complete the re-
quired training.244
240. E.g., TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 415.051 (Vernon 1988) (provides for police licens-
ing in the State of Texas).
241. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 720 P.2d 1093, 1098 (Kan. 1986) (the
court looked to Kansas City Police Department General Order 79-44 in part of the opinion).
243. The Elkhart Indiana Police Department has been accredited and a number of other
Indiana departments, including the Indianapolis Police Department, are in the process. Tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Charles Birch, Indiana State Police (Nov. 2, 1987).
244. Police standards in Indiana are largely governed by the Law Enforcement Training
Board. THE INDIANA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 250 (1984), and INDIANA
CODE §§ 5-2-1-1 to -12, IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-1 to -2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987), govern
the creation of the Law Enforcement Training Board and mandatory training for law enforce-
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Two reasons exist for not applying a pure professional standard to the
assessment of negligent police behavior. First, while police professionalism
is an admirable goal, policing in the United States does not exist at a level
at which a pure professional standard should be applied. 4 5 Second, the pro-
fessional standards model has historically only been applied to doctors, law-
yers, and clergy.246 While some commentators have argued that a profes-
sional standard can be applied to anyone possessing education, training, or
experience superior to that of an ordinary person, it has also been argued
that such application fails to distinguish between a common service and a
more specialized service or occupation. 247 Given the uneven movement of
policing toward professionalization, and given the traditional reluctance to
expand the use of the professional standard much beyond its historical ap-
plication, the preferred solution is to apply a "para-professional"
standard.24 18
The term "para" has been defined to mean "closely resembling/al-
most. '24 9 Thus, the term "para-professional" acknowledges that a person
may have slightly more experience or skill than the average person, but not
enough to be deemed a true professional in the strictest sense of the term.250
ment officers. The Indiana Administrative Code provides:
All law enforcement officers appointed by the State of Indiana or any of its political
subdivisions on or after 2:00 p.m., E.S.T., on Thursday, July 6, 1972, whether said ap-
pointment is on a probationary, permanent, or other than probationary or permanent
basis, shall, within one year of the date of appointment, successfully complete the appro-
priate minimum basic training course prescribed by the law enforcement training
board....
IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 250, 1-2-1 (1988).
245. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Brannon, supra note 227, at 303.
247. Both Wade and Prosser have broadly construed the term profession to include not
only professions, but also almost any full-time occupation. FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS
104 (1986). Friedson criticizes this broad use of "profession" because the definition fails to
distinguish between a "common and an esoteric service." Id. Friedson also notes that:
[t]he specialized service occupations and perhaps especially the established professions,
are judged by the standards of the occupations themselves, while the common service
occupations are not. Both are disadvantaged by being held to a stricter standard than the
ordinary tradesperson is, but the former have the advantage and privilege of being judged
by what are in a sense their own standards, while the latter do not have that privilege.
Id. at 105.
248. Certainly the argument can be advanced that the designation of something as
"para-professional" is to merely engage in an exercise in semantics. Examination of the use of
the word "profession" in the English language indicates, however, that much of the confusion
surrounding the use of the term is a matter of semantics. For example, consider the use of the
words amateur, expert, and occupation in connection with the word profession. For a more
detailed semantic history of the word profession, see FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS 21
(1986). Obviously the term "para-professional" as used in this note is intended to clarify and
not contribute to this confusion.
249. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 830 (1977).
250. As previously indicated, as strictly applied, the term professional only referred to
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Thus, the standard proposed herein bridges the gap between the due care,
or reasonable person standard, and a pure professional standard, and
thereby permits a more accurate and complete assessment of police
activity.251
If a court applied the para-professional standard to the Officer Jones
hypothetical, the legal analysis would proceed along the lines set forth be-
low. 2 52 Assume that Officer Jones has been a police officer in a suburban
Indiana town for six months and has not yet completed the training pre-
scribed by the state. Officer Jones' conduct in determining Mr. Smith's in-
toxication and then releasing him after issuing the traffic citation would
present the court with two immediate issues: first, whether Officer Jones
possessed the minimum level of knowledge of someone with that level of
education, training, skill, and experience; and second, whether Officer Jones
acted reasonably. This determination could be made through the use of ex-
pert witnesses and reference to state guidelines.2 53
Under a traditional negligence analysis, the court would determine
whether Officer Jones owed a duty to the Does' to remove Mr. Smith from
the highway. The court would also determine whether Officer Jones
breached the duty to the Does when he released Mr. Smith from custody.
Officer Jones arguably caused the Does' injuries, and the Does suffered
damages as a result of the accident. Using the para-professional standard,
the court would be able to utilize additional information such as police
training information, other police officer's practices, police manuals, and ex-
pert witnesses to determine whether or not Officer Jones acted in a manner
consistent with how other police officers with the same amount of training
and experience would have acted in the same situation.
D. Abolishing Portions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act
The status of the public duty and special duty rules in Indiana in com-
bination with the Indiana Tort Claims Act presents an inequitable barrier
to recovery by the victim of an intoxicated driver improperly released by a
police officer. Given the importance of the drunk driving issue within the
state, potentially negligent police behavior and subsequent governmental li-
ability should not be insulated from suit on the initial premise that the Indi-
ana Tort Claims Act protects negligent police behavior.25 Even if a court
decided that the wording of the Tort Claims Act is too ambiguous to apply
doctors, lawyers, and the clergy. FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERs 22 (1986).
251. See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text for general discussion regarding
negligence standards.
252. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 135, 158-60 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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to the negligent omission of the failure of a police officer to enforce Indiana
driving while intoxicated laws, the public duty and special duty rules would
apply, thus preventing recovery.255
Indiana courts can take the first step toward remedying the situation
by rejecting the public duty and special duty rules.256 In place of the public
duty and special duty rules, the courts should adopt a "para-professional"
standards model to determine police negligence in Indiana. 257 This standard
not only legitimizes police efforts toward professionalization but also recog-
nizes that policing in Indiana has not reached a level at which a full profes-
sional standard should be applied.258 Furthermore, the standard gives courts
faced with issues currently handled under the public and special duty rules
a workable model from which analysis may properly stem. Perhaps a pure
professional standards model could eventually be applied to police negli-
gence such as Officer Jones' as further steps toward professionalization are
taken in both Indiana and throughout the United States, and as the use of a
pure professional standard is more readily applied to occupations other than
the traditional, learned professions. 5
255. See supra notes 179-200 and accompanying text.
256. The elimination of the public duty and special duty rules by the Indiana courts
would be similar to the action taken by the Colorado Supreme Court in its decision eliminating
the public duty rule in Colorado. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986). Like Indiana,
Colorado had a tort immunity act at the time the Leake decision was rendered. Note, Leake v.
Cain: Abolition of the Public Duty Rule and the Status of Governmental Immunity in Colo-
rado, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 750 (1988). At least one commentator has argued that the position
taken by the Colorado Supreme Court is contrary to the legislative intent of limiting govern-
ment liability. Id. On the other hand, support does exist for the proposition that state supreme
courts should act in a fashion which encourages legislative thought regarding an issue. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text. STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM xvi-xvii (M. Porter & G. Tarr eds. 1982). Professors Porter and Tarr list six
categories of state supreme court policymaking. These are: innovative policymaking (that
which fills a gap in state policy or overturns existing policy); agenda-setting policymaking
(forcing political authorities to reform public policies by upsetting long-standing policies, at-
tention is focused on unacceptable inequities in current policy); complementary policymaking
(rulings that either aid state legislative goals or relieve state legislatures of the onus of taking
politically awkward stands); elaborative policymaking (extension of U.S. Supreme Court pre-
cedent); restrictive policymaking (limitation and/or evasion of policies developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, usually to protect state policies from invalidation); and institutional poli-
cymaking (directed toward preserving the autonomy and integrity of the courts and judicial
process). See generally Blomquist, Solar Energy Development, State Constitutional Interpre-
tation and Mount Laurel II: Second-Order Consequences of Innovative Policymaking by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 573, 576 nn.3-5 (1984) (discussing state su-
preme court action and Professors Porter's and Tarr's categorization within the context of the
Mount Laurel H decision).
257. See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. The determination of whether a pure
professional standard should ever be applied to policing in Indiana could be made by looking
at improved and increased standards as promulgated by the Indiana Law Enforcement Train-
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Adoption of a para-professional standard by the courts would provide a
solution to the inequitable consequences of Tort Claims Act application. 60
Just as the standard could be used in place of the public duty and special
duty rules, it could also be used in place of those sections of the Indiana
Tort Claims Act which insulate negligent police action from detailed scru-
tiny.2 61 Therefore, the Indiana General Assembly should abolish those por-
tions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act which insulate negligent police behav-
ior and permit courts to utilize the para-professional standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
The victim of a drunk driver negligently released by a police officer in
Indiana currently has no remedy. A negligence action against such a police
officer is barred by Indiana's use of the public duty and special duty rules,
and the Indiana Tort Claims Act.26 While other states have abolished the
public duty and special duty rules, Indiana continues to adhere to both
rules and the antiquated concept of sovereign immunity which they
represent.6 8
Ultimately the final disposition of the issue presented in this note rests
with the Indiana General Assembly. Through the initial abolition of the
public duty and special duty rules, the courts will alleviate inequitable re-
sults in cases where the rules are currently applied. In place of the public
duty and special duty rules, the Indiana courts should adopt a para-profes-
sional standard. The Indiana General Assembly should remedy the
problems stemming from the application of the Indiana Tort Claims Act by
abolishing sections of the Act which immunize police behavior and by
ing Board. This would include increased educational and in-service training requirements on a
state-wide scale, and licensing or accreditation requirements. Regarding the use of expert wit-
nesses, to be sure, there are many situations in which an ordinary jury member will be capable
of evaluating evidence presented during the course of a trial even in certain medical malprac-
tice cases. However, given the presentation of the police function in movie, television, and
other media, there may be an even greater need to clarify what proper police procedure is in a
specific situation.
260. See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 33, 173, 174, 179-203 and accompanying text. As a final note
regarding the provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act which immunize negligent police ac-
tivity, brief reference to the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice Standards Relating to The Urban Police Function is helpful. Section 5.5 of the Project,
Tort Liability, states in part:
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the tort remedy for improper police activities,
governmental immunity, where it still exists, should be eliminated, and legislation should
be enacted providing that governmental subdivisions shall be fully liable for the actions of
police officers who are acting within the scope of their employment.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION § 5.5 (Approved Draft 1973).
262. See supra notes 60-171 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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adopting a para-professional standard. Law enforcement officers provide vi-
tal services to the people of Indiana. Negligence within the context of life
and death situations must be subjected to detailed analysis and should not
be condoned under a shield of immunity.
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